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ABSTRACT

MODERNITY AND THE GOOD DEATH: HEIDEGGER AND JOSÉ
CLEMENTE OROZCO’S EPIC OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

Anna M. Jensen
Department of Humanities, Classics, and Comparative Literature
Master of Art

This thesis will analyze José Clemente Orozco’s mural The Epic of American
Civilization in terms of the problem of suffering. It will focus specifically on two
panels, “Human Sacrifice in Ancient Times” and “Human Sacrifice in Modern
Times.” This analysis will comprehend not only the works of art within their
historical context, but also within Martin Heidegger’s philosophical discussion of the
question of suffering.
Heidegger presents a unique perspective on the question of human suffering
when he writes that Western humans have forgotten how to “dwell.” This dwelling
is defined by Heidegger’s novel conception of ontology as relational rather than
individualistic. According to this theory, humans must identify themselves through
their associations, both with other people and with things. Without these
associations, humans are not be able to escape the anxiety

associated with suffering and death brought about by the isolating effects of Western
modernity.
A discussion of Mexico provides a practical example of the complexities of
the question of dwelling in Western thought. At the time Orozco was painting his
mural, Mexican identity was rapidly fragmenting. In the decades after the Mexican
Revolution, many artists wrestled with the concept of Mexican identity, and it was in
this time of flux that Orozco offered his interpretation of the cyclical progress of
humanity.
The two paintings depict two forms of suffering, which this paper will refer
to as a “good” and a “bad” death. This nomenclature is not strictly accurate as
neither form could be said to be desirable in any concrete way. Consequently a
Rivera painting (“Revolution – Germination”) will also be presented that suggests an
ideal death. However, the focus will remain on Orozco’s paintings. Of course, in
his own paintings Orozco is not endorsing the act of human sacrifice. However,
because of differences in their composition, they suggest not only a cyclic pattern to
human history, but also a downward progression where the persistent problems of
violence and suffering in human societies have grown more difficult and complicated
since the advent of modernity.
As Orozco’s paintings seem to suggest and Heidegger will argue, the solution
to the isolating ‘bad death’ is learning to live relationally. These relationships
comprehend the social and the cultural, but the focus will be on the ecological and
the divine, because, as several critics will argue, these are the greatest deficiencies in
modernity.
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Introduction
The Question of Suffering
The question of suffering is a difficult topic, at once so simple as to be proverbial
(“why do bad things happen to good people?”), and yet so complex that it drives whole
systems of thought. Susan Nieman was able to make the argument in her book Evil in
Modern Thought: an Alternative History of Philosophy that suffering is, in fact, the central problem
at the heart of all Western philosophy (2). She considers it to be the basis not only of ethics,
but also of epistemology, ontology, indeed, the whole of philosophy: “At issue are questions
about what the structure of the world must be like for us to think and act within it …I
believe [suffering] is the place where philosophy begins— (5)”
This paper proposes to examine this complex and broad topic specifically in terms of
modernity. In the pursuit of understanding the problems of suffering in modernity, this
paper undertakes to analyze works by José Clemente Orozco in his mural The Epic of
American Civilization, painted on the walls of Dartmouth College in New Hampshire. While
the context of the entire mural will be considered, the focus will be on three panels:
“Human Sacrifice in the Ancient World” and “Human Sacrifice in the Modern World,” and
to a lesser extent, “The Modern Migration of the Spirit”. This work and this artist are
especially relevant to the question of human suffering as Orozco’s geographical, cultural, and
historical context as well as his qualities and goals as an artist offer a unique perspective on
this issue in modernity.
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Keeping in mind the importance of Orozco as an artist, it should be noted that my
approach to his work is more hermeneutical than documentary. Neither Orozco’s explicit
intentions nor the traditional discussion of this piece will be discounted, yet they will be
extended beyond the limits of Orozco’s place and time. This should not be interpreted as a
casual or callous misinterpretation of Orozco’s work, but as a respectful exploration of his
work in the context of contemporary issues. In this light, this mural can become an
engaging discussion not only of circumstances in Orozco’s day, but of the violence and
alleged downward progression of accountability in Western culture as a whole.

A New Interpretation
Traditional interpretations have understood this mural to depict the pervasive
recurrence of suffering in every human epoch, both the forces that cause it and those that
relieve it. He suggests that violence, particularly in the form of human sacrifice, is a kind of
barbarism brought about by superstition and nationalism (if the two can be separated). Yet,
in the light of the interpretation I present here, the two images of human sacrifice, while
comparably violent, seem to differ at least in their representation of the act. In a slightly
more nuanced interpretation, his first panel depicting ancient times can be taken to represent
not a nicer or less painful form of suffering, but perhaps a more meaningful one. Neither
death is desirable, but the death in the first panel is interactive: the victim is surrounded by
priests and the ritual is watched over by a god. Conversely the second panel depicting
modern times can be taken to represent a death that is truly horrific, a true annihilation,
where all accountability has been lost. I suggest that the difference between the two panels
can be explained by a deeper consideration of context, cultural, physical, and spiritual, that
allows the first figure to come nearer to what Martin Heidegger calls a “good death”
(“Building Dwelling Thinking” 151), while the latter panel reflects a downward progression
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of civilization and a worsened state of suffering. The last figure, wracked with anxiety, faces
only a dark abyss.
It must be understood that both panels reflect ‘bad deaths’ to some degree. The
death of the first figure, if only by virtue of being a victim of a human sacrifice rather than a
more natural death, still represents a corruption of civilization. To clarify what is meant by
the good death, brief reference will therefore also be made to Diego Rivera’s painting,
“Revolution – Germination.” This image depicts the body of a martyr of the Revolution,
wrapped in a red cloth, being mourned at the foot of a flowering tree, suggesting more fully
the contextual participation required for a ‘good death.’
However, the focus will remain on Orozco for several reasons. First, as the first
chapter explores in greater depth, Rivera’s work does not function on the same universal
level as Orozco’s and is therefore much more difficult to apply to the modern situation.
Secondly, its lack of ambiguity, that quality so valuable when drawing up a polar discussion
of a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ death, becomes a liability when attempting to discuss real world
situations. So while Rivera’s painting will prove helpful in offering a fairly clear-cut example
of the “good death,” the focus will remain on Orozco’s panels.
Further, it must be said that the most astounding thing in the work of Orozco, which
sets it apart from the work of his contemporaries and occasionally even earned their
indignation, was its honesty. A principle theme in Orozco is this amorality of duality – he
addresses both the positive and the negative aspects of his subject matter, never going so far
as to completely endorse or completely vilify any one thing. It would of course be a mistake
to say that his works depict amorality itself, as the work of Orozco is hardly devoid of moral
significance. However, all is ambiguous: the barbarous human sacrifice among the Aztecs
beside the wonders of their once-flowering culture, industry and art; the carnage and cruelty
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of the Conquest depicted as clearly as the strength and order of the society they bring; the
romantic heroism of Cortez acknowledged within the very same image as his undeniable
cruelty; even the unity between Cortez and Malinche comprehends multiple perspectives.
Their union is not born of love and does not create love, but it does create a new world, a
new race and a new history, and is thus redemptive (although not forgiven). Orozco writes:
“My one theme is humanity. My one tendency is emotion to a maximum. My means, the
real and integral representation of bodies in themselves and in their inter-relation” (Keen
530).
These panels represent then not a polar demarcation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, but a
cyclical progression—from contextualized, interactive violence to abstracted and alienating
violence, the difference being grounded in the modern outlook. Unlike the Rivera painting,
which idealizes the violence and traces it to the very center of regeneration and growth (a
potentially quite dangerous perspective), Orozco condemns it in both paintings. However
this condemnation does not mean that both panels should be taken as completely equal.
Orozco’s second panel can suggest that the violence of the modern world is even more
difficult to bear than that of the ancient, as, shaped by technology, science, and reason, it
fails to provide that crucial context to human suffering. As such, modernity robs experience,
of a comprehensible meaning that could, at least partially, redeem it.

Martin Heidegger and Dwelling
The works of Martin Heidegger, particularly in his later years, offer a useful guide in
this exploration, as he both identifies and offers a solution to the problem of a lack of
context, although he words it differently. His solution is the concept of ‘dwelling,’ an
interior conviction of the worth of other things and the human being’s existence as
relational, ‘among things,’ rather than above or beyond them. According to Heidegger, only
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this mode of ‘being’ allows humans to experience suffering without terror and death with
equanimity (“Building Dwelling Thinking” 151). Only when one identifies with something
outside of oneself can the terror of death, and the anxiety produced by the repression of that
terror, be overcome. This idea will be discussed in further detail in the chapter to come.

Organization of the Essay
The order of this thesis will therefore be as follows: the first section will be an indepth structural analysis of the two main works in question, “Human Sacrifice in the
Modern World” and “Human Sacrifice in the Ancient World” in Orozco’s Epic of American
Civilization. It will also include a discussion of Rivera’s “Revolution – Germination” so that
the idea of contextual dwelling and the good death, the ideal (that Rivera was so devoted to
painting and that Orozco avoided like poison), can be better comprehended. This section
should also bring the questions of this paper into clearer focus: in short, what is the
importance of suffering in human thought and experience? Why is modernity’s approach to
suffering problematic? And finally, what can or should be done about it?
In pursuit of these questions, the thesis will move on to a discussion of José
Clemente Orozco, including his philosophy of art within the context of the Mexican
Revolution of 1910 (an apt time and place to consider suffering). As an artist painting in
early 20th century Mexico, Orozco was dealing with the problems of modernity firsthand.
He was highly conscious of himself and his country as heirs to the violence of the Conquest
and its ensuing damages, and he felt the weight of the history of his country (Orozco 19).
He also felt personally the cultural hierarchical placement of the accomplishments of his
people and his country beneath those of the imperial powers, as all ‘serious’ artists in his day
were expected to study in Europe. His resentment is palpable in his autobiography:
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It was inconceivable that a wretched Mexican should dream of vying
with the world abroad, and so he went to that world abroad to “dedicate
himself” to art, and if he ever afterward gave a thought to the backward
country in which he was born it was only to beg for help in time of need,
momentarily swallowing his proud ‘dedication,’ which in any case had never
protected him from the suspicion of being a vulgar millionaire from the
tropics….the ancients long ago reached perfection, they did everything that
could be done, and nothing is left for us except to copy them and humbly
imitate them. Florentine drawing with Venetian coloring. And if any painter
wishes to be a modernist, let him be off to Montparnasse and there take
orders (20).
Orozco resented this automatic hierarchical placement, and in his art he struggled to
make a valid critique of his (and his country’s) experience that would be of universal value
and application—one that would escape both the nostalgic idealism that he felt afflicted his
compatriot artists and the smug centrality of the European artists, in favor of something
universally relevant.
Using the discussion of Orozco to jump into a still broader pool of thought, the
second chapter will proceed to discuss the nature of suffering in modern times in more
detail, with Orozco’s works as an anchor. It will further elucidate the exact problems with
modernity which seem to hinder dwelling, particularly as manifest in science. This section
on modernity will be concluded with several short but relevant examples of scholarly and
philosophical criticisms that have been made of modernity.
Following this discussion, the argument will briefly consider Mexico in a larger
sense—as the stage where the perhaps definitive clash between modernity and pre-modern
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cultures played out, as well as the scene of a good deal of suffering. As such, Mexico
presents an ideal research area for 1) understanding what exactly constitutes modernity and
2) finding examples of what pre-modern cultures (allegedly) had that modern cultures have
lost.
It must be said that this particular section risks perhaps an unacceptable amount of
generalization and even sentimentality. Heidegger faced similar criticisms in his own
discussion of dwelling, where he used the Ancient Greeks as his models. However, this
paper concurs with Julian Young’s justification of Heidegger’s sometimes not-quite-accurate
portrayal of the Greeks; in a philosophical (or artistic) endeavor scientific accuracy is not as
important as symbolic value. Without undermining the value of such an endeavor, this
argument will not be an anthropological text on pre-modern cultures. Instead it will use all
tools it has at its disposal, including the dreams of a better time invented by artists’ and
philosophers’ minds and projected into the past, to thoroughly think its ethical and
philosophical point through (Young 42 – 43). In this way this paper hopes to honor Orozco
himself, who, while wishing to avoid the sugary, nationalist nostalgia of his contemporaries,
nevertheless did not seek to perfectly represent the history of his country himself. Instead
he used his history as a symbol. However, unlike his contemporaries whose concerns were
largely with the politics of their own day, Orozco endeavored to use these symbols to reach
more universal values that could apply to both past and present.
After the problems of the concept of suffering in modernity have been sufficiently
explored, the third chapter will consider Heidegger’s solution: dwelling. This concept was
earlier described as an interior conviction of the worth of other things and the human
being’s existence as relational, ‘among things,’ rather than above or beyond them. As will be
further explored, this constitutes a rather drastic change in the modern ontological outlook,
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which tends to view being as an individual experience. This chapter will consist of two
sections to further flesh out the concept: one will pursue a discussion of why nature,
symbolic of both relation and difference, must be the arena in which these problems are
solved. The second section will consider the final panel in Orozco’s mural, “The Modern
Migration of the Soul,” considering the deeply felt, indeed in a sense religious, nature of the
solution both Orozco and Heidegger seem to offer.
Lest this paper seem to focus unduly on works of philosophy, or take too much
interpretive license with the work of Orozco, ultimately, because of the unresolved question
of suffering here undertaken, this paper must have a uniquely ethical focus. It will attempt to
explicate and interpret the art of a particular artist and a particular time in terms of a specific
line of thought. Yet its ultimate goal will be contemporary relevance—to use the works of
the past to consider the position of Western culture on suffering at present, to criticize some
of its difficulties, and to offer some potential solutions. This goal seems appropriate in a
discussion of the Mexican muralists, whose “work is as much a comment on contemporary
politics as a representation of past and increasingly distant events—” (Rochfort 208).

An Artistic and Philosophical Hybrid
This philosophical focus does not mean to discount the importance of the art works,
indeed the two go hand in hand. Ultimately their union in this sense is very Heidegerrian, as,
according to him, art can ultimately serve a purpose philosophy cannot:
Because [art] brings to positive presence what [philosophy] can only
indicate negatively, it possesses a kind of ‘power’ [philosophy] does not. This
is one way in which poetic thinking is superior to meditative thinking, why,
from, at least, certain points of view, a Cezanne “is worth a whole library of
philosophy books.” So far as power is concerned, a picture is, as we say,
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worth a thousand words when it comes to reappropriating the ‘mystery’ in
one’s life as well as one’s head…philosophy is only the midwife [of what art
expresses] (Young 20).
Thus Orozco’s panels present a colorful and effective illustration of the thesis of this
paper better than a dry, didactic text ever could. Further, their very openness can inspire
thought above and beyond either artistic intentionality or the ideas outlined here. This value
in art, its intensity and facility in communication, should place it squarely on a level with
philosophy. Certainly this paper would come up lacking if either were neglected.
In summary, Orozco’s two panels “Human Sacrifice in the Ancient World” and
“Human Sacrifice in the Modern World” critique the ineffectiveness of modernity in
providing the experience of suffering and death with meaning. The horizon of modernity
has largely robbed human experience of a sense of context that results not only in continued
suffering, but also in a sense of nihilism and boredom, which only exacerbates the problem.
Only through reinstating value in context and relation will both modern society and the
individual develop a fuller sense of meaning. Orozco’s murals are ultimately a reevaluation
of suffering itself. They suggest that if humanity would no longer aim strictly to eliminate
suffering, as some Enlightenment thinkers sought to do, but to lift it beyond the limits of the
moment, suffering could take on a transcendent, spiritual meaning that may ultimately
redeem it.

Chapter I
Death in the Art of Orozco
An understanding of the function of dwelling in Orozco’s murals should be rooted
in direct analysis. Arranged in a loose chronological order, they focus on two time periods:
pre-Columbian and modern, with the Conquest offering a stark division between them. The
two panels “Human Sacrifice in the Ancient World” and “Human Sacrifice in the Modern
World” are similarly situated in their respective times and offer some insight into the
influence of context on meaning and suffering in human experience.

Rivera and the Good Death
Before beginning the analysis of Orozco’s murals, it is worthwhile to briefly consider
Diego Rivera’s “Revolution – Germination” (see fig. 1) in order to set an example of the
‘good death’ at its most idealized. Located on the western wall of the chapel at the
Autonomous University of Chapingo in Mexico, it is part of a larger fresco that depicts, as
Rochfort writes, “a visual ‘shrine’ to the materialist philosophy and politics of revolution and
to the earth’s fecundity, yet [also] an essentially Biblical atmosphere” (69). This combination
of philosophy, the natural earth, and spiritual references is, as will be shown later, central to
the idea of the ‘good death.’ Indeed, the essential quality of the ‘good death’ is participation
within a context. This context should have social and cultural components, but it is still
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more important that it be related to nature and a sense of the spiritual. Rivera’s martyred
revolutionary is participating in all of these things, to some degree.
Color is perhaps the most striking device Rivera employs here, and the color red
plays a significant part in the composition of the painting. The victim lays on the ground,
wrapped in a scarlet burial shroud, some blood still running down his cheek from his mouth.
The color red is echoed in various contexts throughout the painting, and it stands out
particularly because it is the only bright color in the image. The rest are browns and creams,
with only the slightest shade of blue to contrast with it.
In interpreting this use of color, it is important to note that Diego Rivera was
associated with the Indianist movement in Mexican art. This movement was generally in
alliance with the Revolution, and was an artistic attempt to overthrow European conventions
in favor of a return to a more pre-Columbian culture to match the political struggles. For
artists painting from Mexico City, the references are, of course, predominantly Aztec,
although Maya conventions also find their way into some paintings. Rivera was considerably
influenced by these older art forms, and the philosophy and theology that surrounded
them—at least, to the degree he understood it. In terms of indigenous associations then the
red color becomes very significant, as a reference not only to the violence of the martyr’s
death, but also to concepts of rebirth. Red, as the color of both blood and childbirth, was
considered to be a supremely regenerative color among several indigenous cultures. With
these associations, even in death the martyr becomes the seed of the next generation. This
indigenous association is further enforced in the trickle of blood that runs down the corpse’s
cheek, bearing strong resemblance to certain pre-Columbian images of sacrifice. These older
images often depict noblemen and women making blood sacrifice for their people and
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country (often from the mouth and tongue), with stylized trickles of blood on their cheeks
and chins.
These references to regeneration are quite clear, and Rivera makes them even more
openly in his earlier panel of the same fresco entitled “The Blood of the Revolutionary
Martyrs Fertilizing the Earth.” Certainly it doesn’t get more overt than that. But more
importantly, particularly in terms of the ‘good death,’ this panel contains many references to
the martyr’s context. First, people, their heads bowed in love and respect, surround him.
This small crowd is composed of a variety of people: bowed, anonymous women who were
likely members of the martyr’s family, townsmen, and soldiers, based on their heavy
ammunition—all now inspired by his sacrifice to keep fighting for their country. The
regenerative color red shows up again in the flag they hold—presumably they have been
inspired by the sacrifice of the martyr to make one of their own, like the indigenous
noblemen, so that their country and people can live.
However there is context beyond the human available in this painting, and arguably
the most dominant figure in the panel is not the corpse of the martyr at all, but the thick,
twisted tree growing up behind him. The tree occupies the center of the image, framed on
both sides with standing soldiers and underlined by the corpse that lies just at its roots.
Bright red flowers glowing from the tree’s branches echo the victim’s blood and shroud.
The corpse is an image not only of the rebirth and continuance of the Revolution, but, in
reference to pre-Columbian theology, of the earth itself. Surrounded by people he nurtures
symbolically with his beliefs, and watched over by a strong, vibrant tree he feeds literally with
his blood and body, this martyr has suffered a contextualized, ‘good death.’

Orozco and the Downward Progression of Civilization
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With this image in mind as an ideal ‘good death,’ we now return to the discussion of
Orozco. The context of the murals should offer some insight regarding their interpretation.
While prestigious Dartmouth College in New Hampshire might seem a strange location to
depict ‘Mexican history,’ scholar Desmond Rochfort has this to say about the location of The
Epic of American Civilization:
Although described by Orozco as one of the best examples of
liberalism in the north, Dartmouth College was in fact a bastion of white
Anglo-Saxon educational privilege. Yet the college had had very different
beginnings and intentions, and was founded in the late eighteenth century
specifically for the purpose of providing education for the North American
Indian. The indigenous ancestry of the college in part anticipated Orozco’s
approach to the thematic concept of his mural…The mural was thus
conceived not as a historical narrative in a simple sequential sense, but as the
conceptualization of a historical idea. In this case it was an idea concerning
America, a continent characterized by the dualities of Indian and European
historical experience (Rochfort 103).
Orozco was inspired by the history of the Americas, both Latin and Anglo, which he
saw as intimately connected. Highly conscious of the history of the Conquest in all
of the Americas, not just south of the United States’ border, he chose to paint an
epic story, a saga of the history of the American continents. However this was to be
painted not for strictly historical purposes, but as a concept, or a symbol, of
something more universally human. Rochfort writes:
Unlike Rivera, Orozco did not conceive this historical visualization as
a rhetorical call of nationalist or continentalist liberation and identity. Rather
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he saw the idea of the American experience not only as a duality, but also as a
base on to which he could map the important question of humanity’s endless
struggle to realize its greatest aspirations and ideals and its simultaneous
frustration by its innate fallibility. For Orozco, this dichotomy of the human
character was tragically repetitive and could not be conveniently located
within specific geographical areas, historical times, races, and cultures. The
duality of the American experience, with the intrusion and subjugation of
one people’s culture by another, was thus the perfect ground on which to
reveal such divisions (103).
In short, the dualities of the Indian and the European were taken to suggest dualities
faced by civilizations everywhere, even within individuals, and the comments made
in The Epic of American Civilization are comments not only on Mexican or even
American experience, but of the ancient human drama of all civilization—they are a
meditation on the tension between order and chaos, freedom and oppression, and of
course, life, suffering, and death.
The images do not pull punches, and the first panel “Human Sacrifice in the Ancient
World” is quite shocking (see fig. 2). At first it seems to be a straightforward critique of preConquest barbarity. The victim is masked and bound, inverted, while the priests, also
masked, sink a knife into his naked chest. They grip his hair and his wrists, restraining him.
Huitzilopochtli, who was both a god of war and a sun god, and therefore a god of life, is
embodied in the statue that stands behind the priests. He demands this act, looming
ominous and stoic, dominating the scene. He seems undeniably threatening, even if the
onlooker isn’t aware of his association with war and sacrifice. In one hand the blank-faced,
abstract god holds a red loop of what looks like blood, muscle, or some kind of viscera. In
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the other hand is a fistful of spears and a round shield. His necklace is made of human
hearts in a traditional Aztec style. Golden colored between the hearts, it resembles a knotted
mass of veins or sinews. In short the only parts of the god that are anthropomorphic at all
seem to be stolen bits and pieces of the humans he has destroyed in the name of his
symbols. Between the helpless human and the silent statue, the message seems loud and
clear—crimes are being committed in the name of something numinous.
This is an easy analysis to make, and it is still easier to stop here, examining this panel
only as one of several of Orozco’s examples of the violence inherent in human nature and,
presumably, his condemnation of it. However, on closer look, it seems to merit a slightly
more nuanced approach. Orozco’s symbolism is not meant to be a direct anthropological
reference to Native American practices, so it cannot be (at least not solely) an ethnocentric
condemnation of native customs. However it is certainly not an idealization either—he had
no interest, as the contemporary Indianists did, in conveniently divorcing Aztec heritage
from its violent or shocking practices. It could be interpreted perhaps as a condemnation of
the superstitious power of religion. However the structure of the painting seems to dispute
reading this panel in this way, and there are several reasons for this.
First, in contrast to the later modern panel, and in spite of the violent act that forms
its subject matter, this painting is quite legible, quite clear in its representation. Realism
alone does not of course necessarily imply a softer subject matter. The clarity of many realist
paintings can be interpreted appropriately as depicting the harshness of reality in their sharp
lines and angles. And there is undeniably something harsh about this painting. Yet it is
somehow softer than a true realist painting—legible, but not entirely photographic. The
lines are soothing, warm, and organic. They curve and blend into each other. The position
of the victim forms an X shape, which brings the viewer’s focus directly into the center of
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the painting, making it structurally ordered. While all the lines in the painting point to the
moment of sacrifice where the knife sinks into the victim’s chest, the violence is subdued.
There is no blood or gore. The colors are warm and fleshy: browns, tans, and rusty reds.
The only grey in the panel is in the sacrificial stone and the weapons in the god’s left hand.
Further, the scene is stylistically idealized—some of the naked priests’ bodies are beautifully
painted, anatomical and graceful enough for a Canova. And while the piece is not typically
realistic, it could never be called abstract or non-representational. The form is clear and
legible. In spite of the subject matter, the panel is somehow graceful and serene.
Its location further lends itself to a gentler analysis. Rochfort describes the
chronology of the mural as a circular undulation of civilization, from its crest in a golden age
of civilization to various low points in acts of violence (Rochfort 109). This pattern is
noticeable in the progression of the figure of Quetzalcoatl, who appears early in the mural to
bestow tools, laws, and other gifts of civilization upon the early inhabitants of the land (see
fig. 3), inaugurating a “Pre-Columbian Golden Age” (see fig. 4). However, the priests and
magicians become unruly and power-hungry, and the civilization returns to a violent trough
in the “Departure of Quetzalcoatl” (see fig. 5), where the frustrated god leaves his people
with promises of eventual return and accompanying righteous destruction. It is worth
remembering that Orozco is speaking symbolically. In the mural Quetzalcoatl stands for
universal benevolence, not a specific pre-Columbian theology or priestly cult.
The symbolic value of Orozco’s pre-Columbian panels mirrors that of those coming
after the Conquest, as the pattern of the bestowal of the gifts of civilization and their ensuing
misuse results in violence throughout the mural. After “The Departure of Quetzalcoatl,”
Orozco proceeds to paint the Conquest and the somewhat unsettling, if orderly, civilization
of the European emigrants. Because of this symmetry in the mural, many scholars, Rochfort
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included, take the first human sacrifice panel to be suggestive of this degenerate violence that
leads to the crumbling of a civilization.
There is no denying that the above interpretation is in many ways accurate. Yet, this
does not have to be its sole purpose. After all, in terms of the symmetry of the mural,
“Human Sacrifice in Ancient Times” seems startlingly out of place. Unlike “The Departure
of Quetzalcoatl,” “The Conquest,” or the later “Human Sacrifice in Modern Times,”
“Human Sacrifice in Ancient Times” is not situated among panels that depict corruption and
greed. It is situated earlier, prior to the coming of Quetzalcoatl, prior to the instigation of
the Golden Age, and certainly before its fall. This placement suggests that it is not an
example of the full flower of degeneration and greed that Orozco is condemning.
That is of course not to say that Orozco embraced human sacrifice, or that it isn’t
meant to depict an undesirable action. Presenting human sacrifice as prior to civilization
does not make it desirable. The Aztec gods Orozco chooses to depict suggest this as well, as
the sacrifice is presided over by Huitzilopochtli, not Quetzalcoatl. The placement of
“Human Sacrifice in Ancient Times” before the coming of Quetzalcoatl suggests that the
civilizing god would have done away with the practice in building up a golden age, and
indeed he does. To make it still clearer that Orozco is not praising human sacrifice or even
indigenous cultures in any preferential way, in the later panels the reinstitution of human
sacrifice plays a role in the eventual degeneration of the Aztecs. This is suggested in the
blood-red temple that rises up behind the corrupt, apish priests in “The Departure of
Quetzalcoatl.” But “Human Sacrifice in the Modern World,” situated nearly at the
beginning of the mural, is not a result of greed and degradation. This placement seems to
suggest the possibility of some interpretation beyond either praise or strict condemnation.

Context and Suffering
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As context has been used to set the panel “Human Sacrifice in Ancient Times” apart
from others like it, context can also be useful in establishing its meaning. Again, the murals
are widely acknowledged to be an examination of the tragic arc of human existence, and
Orozco has no inclination to disregard the occurrence or significance of suffering and death.
But this panel of suffering, unlike its violent brothers, is snugly situated within a larger
context. It appears between a panel that depicts the immigration of the Aztecs to the valley
of Tenochtitlán, and a panel of Aztec warriors dressed in feathers and skins, with strong,
stoic faces. While neither of these paintings is idealized in an Indianist manner, the
placement of the sacrificial panel between them is nevertheless integrated within the history
of its subject, and given context. The human sacrifice it depicts, while undeniably terrible,
nevertheless is presented as a part of a larger culture. It is integrated within a legible context,
and the terror of the image, compared with the later one, is mitigated.
This painting could be seen, then, not just as a condemnation of violence, but as a
statement on different varieties of it. It interrogates the ideological motivations and
ontological assumptions behind such an act of violence. In short, why did they do such
things? The answer is because the nature of their reality demanded it. The gods, whose
images the priests assume, asked for such a sacrifice. And because the humans and gods
lived relationally, each needing the other, humans obeyed.
The ritualized, sacred elements of worship are not hard to find here. The priests, like
the victim, are masked. However, although their faces are covered, they have not been
annihilated. Instead they wear the faces of the gods, transcending their individuality. Their
naked human bodies and their divine faces could embody the joining of the sacred and the
earthly. In this context, the sublime melts into the terrible, the sacred into the mundane, and
the human becomes an integrated part of the universe, an organic member. The
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perpetrators, bloody murderers to the modern eye, functioned in their time as holy,
sanctified men, driven on by otherworldly command, acting as gods to minister in life and
death; not via usurpation, but personification. The will of the gods and the sacred
experience of the priests offer a context for the act of violence and suffering, which
mitigates some of its terror and allows the victim, like Rivera’s corpse, to come closer to
participating in what Heidegger calls a ‘good death.’
Young offers an apt description of the kind of worldview, defined by context, that
could underlie such an act, as well as provides clarity on the comparison between Orozco’s
Pre-Columbians and Heidegger’s Greeks:
The Greeks, then, experienced their world as brought into, and sustained in,
being by an overwhelmingly powerful, utterly mysterious force. More
exactly, they experienced it as the self-display of the simultaneously selfconcealing divinity, ‘the most sublime of gods’, as Sophocles calls it. But this
made the Greek world a place pregnant with the present of ‘the
overpowering’, ‘touched by the exciting nearness of the fire from the
heavens’. It was, in short, a numinous world, a holy, sacred place (Young
41).
The Aztecs can be understood, in this interpretation of the works of Orozco, in the same
way, as existing in a holy world. Their existence, including their sufferings, is ‘sublime.’
Admittedly, here the analysis becomes rather difficult, as the artist never quite offers
commentary on this kind of interpretation. While Orozco was no more a fan of modernity
than of Indianism (Helm 62), he does not seem to ever define his painting as a contrast in
suffering, or as a good and bad death. It could be suggested that the image of Quetzalcoatl
the warriors bear in the panel “Aztec Warriors” represents a certain approbation to the
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practice given by the gods, but even that is perhaps going too far. The image of
Quetzalcoatl as the feathered serpent in “Aztec Warriors” is more likely analogous to the
cross the later Spaniards carry as they execute the Conquest in the name of Christ. The
violence is still condemned, even if it has been somehow culturally or religiously justified.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence for this interpretation. As has been mentioned,
Orozco certainly took issue with some aspects of modernity, particularly technology,
mechanization, and relentless war (Oles 197). These issues can especially be seen in his later
panels depicting human suffering, where his system of representation changes. Where the
earlier panel was tragic, the later panels are both tragic and disorderly. It could be said that
the earlier panel tells a sad story that is soon remedied by the civilizing god, the latter panel
documents a present condition that has not yet been fixed.
Indeed, the next panel provides a direct contrast to the first. “Human Sacrifice in
the Modern World,” a titular and structural echo to the earlier panel, offers an example of
human suffering that is truly frightening (see fig. 6). Like the earlier panel, its location in the
general mural is significant. Located after the panel “Gods of the Modern World,” the
modern sacrificial panel is nevertheless not spatially integrated within its era. It rests on its
own wall, with about six inches of white space surrounding it, cutting it off from other
things. It touches nothing—this white space suggests the visual equivalent of silence.
But the panels have other things in common. While it is located chronologically
later, after the panels of “The Conquest” and “The Machine” and the mechanical
abstractions that form the divisions between them, the makeup of this second half of the
mural is structurally similar to the first. There is another migration (“Cortez and the Cross,”
“The Machine”). The preceding panel “Gods of the Modern World” depicts another set of
gods to give order to the world (see fig. 7). However, even compared with Huitzilopochtli
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and his necklace made of hearts, these gods seem particularly horrific. While life under
Huitzilopochtli was clearly no picnic (and Orozco, as will be discussed later, goes out of his
way to avoid idealizing the Aztecs), his ominous depiction was not as frightening as these
living mummies, these bony professors. They are skeletal, frightening figures, delivering
stillborn babies in mortarboards from a wracked, bony figure [Orozco intended to name her
“Alma Mater” although he never got around to painting it in (Baas 159)] strewn over a pile
of books. And then the panel itself, whose location suggests like the earlier panel a
degeneration of culture—the culture’s true tenets displayed in form of violence.
There are more structural similarities with the earlier panel. Here the figure is
splayed on his back in the same manner, although inverted, and his feet, covered with thick,
soldierly boots, face the viewer where the earlier victim’s face looked out from behind its
mask. Like the other figure, he is on his back, floored by his attackers, and surrounded by
the agents of his sacrifice. But where the first scene was clear and legible, this scene is far
less straightforward. It is much more abstract, much more difficult to read, even down to its
representational structure. The other painting contains easily identifiable human figures,
although masked, and the god behind them is quite definable as well. In the second scene,
the central figure is hardly recognizable as human. At such a strange angle he is difficult to
locate under the heap of flowery wreaths and garish flags that cover him, and only his
desperate, clawing hands and splayed feet eventually suggest there is a human underneath.
Even then, he is removed from a state of recognizable humanity because, where the central
figure in the first panel is flesh, this figure is only white bone. Bone clothed in boots and a
soldier’s coat, but not flesh. And rather than being transcended, the human is utterly,
literally effaced. In fact, he has no face at all. Instead of a mask of a god’s face and a human
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body, simultaneously hiding and transcending his humanity, this figure’s entire head and
body are obscured.
The use of masks in the mural is potentially suggestive. Orozco makes use of them
more than once—the sacrificial victim in the first panel wears one, as well as the priests
committing the sacrifice. The Spanish horses wear armored masks during the Conquest,
although Cortez himself does not. And then, the figure of the modern human sacrifice is
veiled beneath piles of flags and wreaths. This ubiquitous symbol seems to suggest a
connection between these figures—that the terror and violence of the Spanish horses and
the effacement of the modern sacrificial victim are to be identified with the violence in the
first panel as symbols of barbarity and de-humanization.
Again, this interpretation is perfectly appropriate. However, it might be possible to
add more as not all the masks seem to be equal. It would of course be foolish to deny the
parallel between the use of masks in the first sacrificial panel and the last, yet again the
representation differs. This perhaps suggests that the masks are of a different nature.
Indeed, the latter figure can hardly be said to be wearing a mask. The whole upper half of
his body is obscured, lost beneath chaotic folds. Nothing remains of him that even suggests
a human face. Whereas the figure in the original panel, still masked (again, human sacrifice
is not good), at least has a face, if not his own. He resembles the priests, holy men, and the
god itself. He lies still, and whatever his personal reaction, the mask seems almost to smile.
His situation is not enviable, which perhaps the mask’s presence suggests, but it is
contextualized. He is still dehumanized, but his humanity (even as it suffers) is transcended,
channeled into the divine, whereas the poor later sacrifice’s humanity is destroyed
completely. Both masks can be said to dehumanize, but that does not mean there are not
significant differences in the mode of dehumanization.
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Returning to the analysis, the depicted context of the two actions differs vastly. The
final figure is completely alone. Here no priests tug on his arms and legs. His bony fingers,
not quite alive in their fleshless state but not quite dead in their convulsion, claw at the bare
ground. His legs stick out in an undignified way. The modern context offered by his world
does not extend an integrated sense of meaning to his suffering, and the whole panel speaks
of anxiety and terror. There is one other human figure in the painting, a man to the left of
the victim, but the two do not interact. Fat, isolated, white-eyed, he directs a band, or reads
a speech into a microphone. But the sound has no audience apart from the tortured victim,
whom the speaker neither observes nor touches, perhaps because the figure himself is
terrified by the specter of death before him. The blaring instruments behind him only add a
louder, more chaotic element to the scene rather than organizing it. The meaning this figure
attempts to give the scene does not resonate.
The second chapter will discuss in more detail the significance of nature and the holy
in dwelling, but for now it is telling that there is no sign of nature in the scene. The
background is purely technical and inorganic. Nature is at least present in the first panel, if
only in the background. It places the humans, making them both synonymous with it at the
feet of the gods and higher than it as agents acting in those gods’ names. It is perhaps also
significant that Aztec deities were aligned with certain natural forces. In many ways that
heavily influential figure in the first painting is nature. In the second panel, these natural
references are utterly absent.
But there are forces of influence in the modern painting that replace this
simultaneously nature-based and divine source. No doubt inspired by the spectral, barren
gods of the panel that precedes it, these new forces of influence include an anthropomorphic
statue of a soldier behind the central figure, mid-bayonet thrust or rifle shot, on a large
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marble block with stone laurel wreathes carved into it. This figure holds the same location
as the god in the previous panel, but here it is not transcendence or nature being honored,
but war, technology, and humanity as a machine. Significantly, this figure, obviously stone,
appears more human than the actual body on the floor, more real than the real. And
although he is a simulacrum, he is certainly more successful than the unfortunate victim.
The statue’s very lifelessness allows it to become an image of physical, modern perfection—a
perfection the actual human body can never attain, certainly not under these circumstances.
The flags stand in the foreground, the statue of the soldier behind, taking the place of the
god that floated as an explanation for the destruction below in the earlier panel.
Color plays a significant role in this reading as well. “Human Sacrifice in Modern
Times” lacks the organic flesh and brown colors of its counterpart, but it is not dull. A
multicolored mess of a flag drapes the face and body of the victim. Other flags, colorful and
garish, dominate the scene. The warrior is draped in bright pink wreathes, presumably given
for glory or honor in war, but they don’t resemble flowers. In color and texture they
resemble dead flesh, meat, bright wreathes of muscle or brains, thrown with abandon on the
helpless, immobile corpse. In contrast, the figure itself, supposedly the central focus, is
strictly monochrome. He fades into the background. The flags, wreathes, and greenishtinted brass of the band are excessively colorful, distracting and confusing the eye.
In subject matter then, this also is a human sacrifice. But it is missing something that
could make the ancient sacrifice, though terrible, closer to the meaningful death in Rivera’s
painting. The forces that have replaced the gods to penetrate and persuade men towards
destruction lack the colossal, bio-centric power of the earlier gods. They are now driven by
strictly human drives: patriotism, scholasticism, modernity, science, and progress, inevitably
culminating in the drive toward war and conquest. But even participation in that narrative,
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life as a soldier, fails to provide any reciprocity or sympathy in the figure’s surroundings.
The modern commodification of a person through industry becomes the commodification
of a person as a soldier, with patriotism as the hypnotic sleep word. The failing of both
panels, worsening significantly in the second, is the figures’ inability to identify with things
outside of themselves. The less contact they make, the less relational their death, and the
less meaning and unity can be found therein.
The second panel then can be taken to function as an accusation, a depiction of the
shortcomings of modernity. To repeat, neither form of suffering here can be said to be
desirable. Yet if one accepts the inevitability of perhaps suffering and certainly death in the
life of a mortal human, there are ways to make it more bearable. This should be clear in the
earlier panel, where the humans are united with each other and with their god, and even the
viewer can be drawn into the painting as the victim himself stares straight out. In the second
panel everything is disjointed. It isolates, rather than unites, dissects more than mends. The
results of this destruction are not transcendent as in the earlier panel. Rather they leave the
figure dead, inert, and dreadfully alone. Significantly, in the first panel the perpetrators of
the crime are human; in this panel, the figure has been killed by abstractions and has already
rotted away.

Universality in Art
The primary reason Orozco is the focus of this study rather than Rivera is partially
because of the universal quality of his art. He wanted to depict the narrative arc of
civilization, embodied within the American experience of the Conquest, and interrogate the
things that can derail it. As such, as has been stated, Orozco was a vocal critic of the artistic
movement of Indianism. This movement styled itself a return to the Aztec past and the
grounds for a patriotic Renaissance. However Orozco saw it as dangerously paradoxical and
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hypocritical. Naturally Orozco was no fan of European hegemony, and was skeptical of
modernity, or at least of its progressive claims. However he questioned and even deeply
resented Indianism’s pretensions of authenticity. For Orozco it was common sense that the
Indianist pursuit of ancient culture was neither possible nor desirable. He felt the Indianists
were either naïve or disingenuous in their romantic approach to history, and he expresses his
indignation at their failure to adequately nuance the effects of the Conquest:
According to [the Indianists] the Conquest ought not to have taken
place as it did. Instead of sending cruel and ambitious captains to the New
World, Spain should have sent a great delegation of ethnologists,
anthropologists, archeologists, civil engineers, dentists, veterinarians,
physicians, country school-teachers, agronomists, Red Cross nurses,
philosophers, philologists, biologists, art critics, mural painters, and learned
historians. On reaching Vera Cruz the caravels should have unloaded
carriages, adorned with symbolical floral designs, with Cortés and his
captains in one of them, carrying baskets of lilies and a great many other
followers and confetti and paper ribbon on the way to render homage to
powerful Moctezuma and afterwards to set up bacteriological, urological, Xray, and ultra-violet-ray laboratories, a Department of Public Works,
universities, kindergartens, libraries, and banking houses. Instead of
accepting the Aztec and Toltec maidens so frequently offered to them, the
Spaniards should have brought along nice-looking girls from Galicia and
Andalusia as gifts to Moctezuma and Cuauhtémoc. Alvarado, Ordaz,
Sandoval, and other stout fellows should have been detailed to guard the
ruins lest any least bit of the tremendous pre-Cortesian Art be lost. They
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should have learned the seven hundred and eighty-two distinct languages that
were spoken here. They should have respected the indigenous religion and
left Huitzilopochtli standing. There should have been a free distribution of
grain, cattle, and agricultural machinery. Free housing could have been
provided for the country folk, and common landholdings and cooperatives
established. Roads and bridges might have been built. There were new
industries and sports to inculcate, all in the best manner, gently and
affectionately. Human sacrifice might have been encouraged further, and a
great packing house built for human flesh, with a department to handle
canning and refrigeration… (Orozco 110).
Irony aside, for Orozco Indianism was not a valid response to the problems of his
times. As he describes, it failed to address the little nuances and ambiguities of civilization,
or of any discussion of history. Hopelessly romanticizing the Indians while vilifying the
Spaniards was simply not constructive. Nor was it as novel as it claimed—Orozco felt that
Indianism was a mere recycling of the same old, destructive tenets that would inevitably face
the same outcomes and failures. In this light, beyond the naïveté of such a romantic
approach, to Orozco the goals of Indianism were not only absurd but also dangerous, the
mere reversal of the Hispanist colonial mindset. Rather than a return to Aztec society,
whatever that might be, Orozco believed that Indianism had a conquering mindset of its
own. It was not resurrecting something ancient and oppressed, but manipulating the same
propagandistic tools of the earlier Conquest and the ruling class in order to establish a
merely recycled, nationalistic, and in the view of Orozco, racist and dangerous order.
In light of these views, Orozco’s intentions, or at least the interpretations made
possible by his murals, gain more clarity. His opinions on Indianism illustrate more sharply
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his commitment to discovering something more widely applicable in his art. He is interested
in more than the duality of Indians and Europeans, more than the historical details. He is
making a statement about human nature and suffering that can be applied to all history, and
all peoples:
Unlike Rivera, Orozco did not conceive this historical visualization as
a rhetorical call of nationalist or continentalist liberation and identity. Rather,
he saw the idea of the American experience not only as a duality, but also as a
base on to which he could map the important question of humanity’s endless
struggle to realize its greatest aspirations and ideals and its simultaneous
frustration by its innate fallibility. For Orozco, this dichotomy of the human
character was tragically repetitive and could not be conveniently located
within specific geographical areas, historical times, races and cultures. The
duality of the American experience, with the intrusion and subjugation of
one people’s culture by another, was thus the perfect ground on which to
reveal such divisions (Rochfort 103).
So while both panels depict violence and sacrifice, they are meant to act as symbols
of things that are universal to humanity, not just the history of the Aztec and European. In
his panels, the distinctly religious tones of the Aztec metanarrative at least partially draw the
civilization together, but they could be any civilization with an adequate metanarrative. Only
through this contextualization can the sacrifice become exactly that, a sacrifice—something
sacred, that binds things together. The metanarrative of the first panel includes violence in
its content, but it makes the world legible to its adherents, as the painting is legible to its
viewers. In contrast, the metanarrative of modern times, equally universal in terms of the
violence that results from its circumstances, has lost its sense of meaning, as reflected in the
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painting’s illegibility. The ritual and art that surround it only detract from the sublimity of
the sacrifice, and the victim is not allowed to transcend his mortal state. He only succumbs
to it, becoming an abstraction of history. The sacrifice is meaningless.

José Clemente Orozco
Depicting Mexican history became very popular in Orozco’s time, and he, Rivera,
and Siqueiros all do it in one form or another. However Orozco’s work is unique. He was
able to move beyond the destructive idealism of Indianism to question the very nature of
suffering, and its impact on human existence. He recognized the need for change in his
society and his art was very much commenting specifically on the conditions of his time.
But Orozco wanted to do more than this. Unlike his fellow muralists, ultimately Orozco
was not interested in utopias. He was interested in an art that transcended these things, one
that would have universal application.
Born in the state of Jalisco in 1883, Orozco first came to experience art as an
observer of José Guadalupe Posada, the famous engraver and cartoonist. Orozco would
pass his shop on his walk to and from school every day, and was fascinated by the artist’s
process:
Posada used to work in full view, behind the shop windows, and on my
way to school and back, four times a day, I would stop and spend a few
enchanted minutes in watching him, and sometimes I even ventured to enter the
shop and snatch up a bit of the metal shavings that fell from the minium-coated
metal plate as the master’s graver passed over it (Orozco 8).
Posada was an early political as well as artistic influence on Orozco (Orozco xx). As
a prominent critic of the oppressive Porfiriato, Posada’s cartoons were originally published in
the leftist magazine El Machete. Because of his distinctly local art and the bold opinions
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portrayed therein, he was highly influential on all three of the muralists. He was perhaps
best known for his irresistible images of cheerful skeletons going about the business of
ordinary people. Since grown famous under the name Las Calaveras, they quickly became a
wider symbol for all of Mexico, with definite socialist undertones. Rochfort talks about the
political tenor and influence of Posada’s work:
Posada’s work, usually published in Vanegas Arroyas’ street
newspapers…was more than a mere catalogue of events. As a man of the
people, Posada remained close to them all his working life. He was a rebel
repulsed by the injustices of the dictatorship of the Porfiriato. Prints such as
“The Ruling Misery,” “The Ballad of Four Zapatistas Killed by Firing
Squad,” and “The Horrible Crimes of the Landowners” show Posada as a
political populist, champion of the cause of freedom and justice. (Rochfort
17)
Posada’s art and politics were influential on all of the muralists. Indeed, one of
Diego Rivera’s most famous paintings is an example of a Posada-inspired Calavera in his
mural panel “A Dream of a Sunday Afternoon in Alameda Park.” In the painting a skeleton
stands holding her purse and wearing a feathered dress, a wide grin across her toothy face.
Around her people work and talk, and take no notice of this unusual figure. Rivera included
other Calavera figures in his paintings, participating, as they did in Posada’s work, in scenes of
everyday life: sometimes they play in bands, sometimes they dance, and sometimes they
gather flowers. They are always interspersed among the living, who seem to be untroubled
by their presence. Rivera recycled both Posada’s imagery and his goals: Las Calaveras were
meant to embody a sense of unique national unity and communal experience. They united a
sense of the imminence of the spiritual world with the quotidian in an effortless way that,
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while perhaps not “authentically” Aztec, is distinctly non-European. In their time Las
Calaveras inspired thousands of Mexicans with national pride. They asserted an identity that
was uniquely Mexican—Aztec in its cult-of-the-dead references, Spanish in dress, and thus
mestizo in apparent contemporary culture.
While Rivera’s use of Calaveras in his art is the most direct reference to Posada from
the muralists, the goals they embody were common among them. And the muralists were
not alone. In Orozco’s day, Mexico was afire with nationalistic fervor (Rochfort 15).
Mexicans were searching for a national identity, partially defined by the desire to shake off
the culture of modernity, associated with capitalism and conquest, which had driven the
colonization and exploitation of Mexico’s land and peoples. Many revolutionaries and
patriots felt that if all went right in the Revolution, this history would be transcended and for
the first time Mexico’s divided population of Indians, whites, and mestizos would ostensibly
come together to be Mexicans.
Orozco was deeply inspired by these things, even at a young age. The idea of
creating an identity that was uniquely different from Spain, that could even compete with
Spain (culturally if not economically), fascinated him and made him a willing convert to the
Mexican cause. He believed so deeply in the value of Mexico’s culture that he refused to go
to Paris to study art, a step taken by Rivera and considered necessary for all artists who
wanted to follow the Western tradition. Orozco had no stomach for such European
pretension. Through Posada and his associations with other Mexican artists, Orozco saw
the colonialist assumptions about class separation and economics that were built into “The
Grand Tour” and the conventions of acceptable art. He resented these assumptions and
refused to reinforce them.

The Significance of American Art
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However, Orozco’s artistic goals were not founded solely on a sense of rebellion
against the social norms that held against him. For Orozco the restriction of artistic learning
and display to Paris was not only ridiculous and elitist, but also completely backward. Like
other American artists of his time, Orozco came to believe that European art was
degenerate, not American art. For Orozco, European art was from a dying civilization,
caught in an endless cultural round of trying to recapture old glories and aimlessly pursuing
the blind alley of novelty at the expense of meaning. For Orozco, American art could offer
precisely what European art was looking for: meaning, and wonder, in abundance.
More clarity on this idea can be found within the distinctly American literary
movement of lo real maravilloso. Although the movement was not fully described until Cuban
writer Alejo Carpentier wrote about it in 1949, it offers a sense of the multiplicity of Latin
American reality that inspired Orozco. It is the sense of the uncanny, of surprise, of not
being able to reconcile contradictions, yet being generally undisturbed by this. A play on the
term magical realism, which described certain European artistic conventions within the
surrealist movement, the term lo real maravilloso was coined by Carpentier, subtly altering the
meaning of the phrase. Marvelous reality, as it were, defines itself against European magical
realism. And while Orozco was too early to be a magical realist himself, his art surely
foreshadows some of their conventions:
In Latin America, Carpentier argues, the fantastic is not to be
discovered by subverting or transcending reality with abstract forms and
manufactured combinations of images. Rather the fantastic inheres in the
natural and human realities of time and place, where improbable
juxtapositions and marvelous mixtures exist by virtue of Latin America’s
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varied history, geography, demography, and politics – not by manifesto
(Zamora and Faris 75).
This sense of lo real maravilloso, then, included for many Latin American artists
a certain sense of ‘magic’ and even what Heidegger will call ‘the holy’ as present
every day, all around. It was not something that had to be sought for or imagined.
It was not something symbolic, or at least, not solely symbolic. It was real, and a
part of everyday life. This odd situation came about because of all the influences on
Mexico, the dualities of culture and history, of geography and politics. In short,
Mexico’s hybridity was a marvelous source of artistic inspiration, as Orozco well
knew.
Indeed, Orozco had tremendous faith in the value of hybridity. His sense of
marvelous reality was always accompanied by a stubborn sense of the value of the Mexican
experience as equal with that of the European, and a strong faith in Mexican potential. After
all”
We too had a character, which was quite the equal of any other. We
would learn what the ancients and the foreigners could teach us, but we
could do as much as they, or more….Why must we be eternally on our knees
before the Kants and the Hugos? All praise to the masters indeed, but we
too could produce a Kant or a Hugo. We too could wrest iron from the
bowels of the earth and fashion it into ships and machines. We could raise
prodigious cities, and create nations, and explore the universe. Was it not
from a mixture of two races that the titans sprang (21)?
For all of these reasons, Orozco wanted primarily to paint from the Americas, about
the Americas. In contrast with the heavily-trodden, rainy streets of Europe, the Americas,
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and Mexico in particular, seemed fresh and new. Its experiences were pure, its reality
distinct and enhanced. Since the Academy was “a warehouse of mummies and fossils,” (26)
Orozco took his art to the streets of Mexico City. His art flowered as he explored “the
wretchedest barrios in the city. On every canvas there began to appear, bit by bit, like a dawn,
the Mexican landscape, and familiar forms and the colors” (21). His symbolist sympathies
allowed him to engage and expand upon the physical realities he saw, turning the everyday
world around him into a marvellous reality, full of meaning and wonder.
Further, Orozco sensed that the act of creating something in art gave it place and
memory in a culture (Orozco 21). And if that was the case then it was Mexico, not France,
which needed creation and appreciation. It was Mexico whose people had been oppressed
for centuries, not only under the physical and economic mantle of class division and slavery,
but also under the cultural and mental burden of a perceived inferiority to the dominant
class, partially perpetuated through the conventions of art. Orozco wanted Mexicans to take
pride in their Mexicanness, not to pine for a country that was never theirs. These interests
and passions quite naturally led him toward the revolutionary spirit that was brewing in the
country.

Orozco as Unique
Yet he never fully converted to the revolutionary cause, for several reasons. The
unique purposes of Orozco’s art come into clearest focus against the background of the
work of his contemporaries. First, it is worthwhile to consider the things they have in
common. They are after all historically grouped for more than chronological reasons. It is
fair to say that all the muralists wanted their art to be informed by political sentiments. Both
Siqueiros and Rivera were particularly inspired by Marxism, although Orozco, typically, had
his reservations (Rochfort 119). Politically charged and supported by the people, the
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muralists wanted to shrug off the elitist attitudes of European art. They wanted to make art
big and accessible—art for the people, not for a small privileged class. The new mural art
would be free to all, non-aristocratic, and would glorify the everyday lives of the workers and
the proletariat instead of the indolence of the leisure class. Rivera and Siqueiros particularly
wanted to inspire action and change for the better.
Arguably, this desire can most strongly be seen in the work of Diego Rivera, whose
murals are literally crowded with working people. Rivera’s murals largely glorify work and
labor and the plain life of the teeming peasant class. He paints the proletariat. These are
people who cannot afford fine things or even privacy, but they are not unhappy (unless
being subjected to cruel indignities by the occasionally painted oppressor). His murals send
a Marxist message that is clear as a bell: while he is not offering leisure and abundance to all,
he is offering freedom and dignity for the difficult lives of the working class. As mentioned,
Rivera was associated with the Indianists, and used many pre-Columbian references (some
accurate, some less so) to communicate his hope for a glorious, Marxist future that would be
reborn from the ashes of the past.
Siqueiros’ work takes on a distinctly darker tone. Influenced by Italian Futurism
(although abandoning its vicious optimism) and Russian Expressionism, he focuses on the
pain and sufferings of the lower class at the hands of the elite (Rochfort 31). A devoted
Indianist and Marxist, he wrote a manifesto describing the purposes of his art and the artistic
progression he hoped for his country:
Repudiamos la llamada pintura de caballete y todo el arte de los
círculos ultraintelectuales, porque es aristocrático, y glorificamos la expresión
del ARTE MONUMENTAL, porque es una propiedad pública.
Proclamamos que dado que el momento social es de transición entre un
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orden decrépito y uno nuevo, los creadores de belleza deben realizar sus
mayores esfuerzos para hacer su producción de valor ideológico para el
pueblo, y la meta ideal del arte, que actualmente es una expresión de
masturbación individualista, sea arte para todos, de educación y batalla
(Siqueiros, quoted in Wittman 174).i
Thus afire with an enthusiasm for the dawn of the art of the people at least as strong
as his contempt for the Academy, Siqueiros painted the history of the oppression of Mexico.
This is a history which, under his brush, glorifies the struggle of the native and the Mexican
and condemns the thoughtless excesses of the invading culture (Rochfort 109). Where
Rivera’s work seeks to reveal the happy, industrious, bustling community the working class
could be, Siqueiros points a finger at the forces that stand in the way of that reality and the
subsequent sufferings of the people. Both Rivera and Siqueiros are aiming toward a brighter
Marxist future, where the lower class will receive its dignity and the oppressors will be
toppled.
This perspective couldn’t be further from the less optimistic, cyclical progression of
The Epic of American Civilization. Certainly Orozco too had leftist leanings and sympathies. In
his autobiography he records being influenced by the fiery Siqueiros who, post-prison stint
for an attack on Leon Trotsky (Rochfort 185), had traveled in Europe and studied Marxism
and Leninism in the Soviet Union (Orozco 92). However, he just couldn’t muster the same
level of enthusiasm as his colleagues, whom he saw as driven in part by overly romanticized
notions of the life of the worker. For Orozco the error in romanticizing the proletariat was
as close as the artists’ patrons themselves, who were, ironically, nearly always members of the
elite class:
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Proletarian art consisted in pictures of workers on the job, and it was
supposedly intended for them. But this turned out to be an error, since a
worker who has spent eight hours in the shop takes no pleasure in coming
home to a picture of workers on the job. He wants something different,
which has nothing to do with work…the comical thing about it all was that
the bourgeois bought proletarian art at fancy prices, though it was supposed
to be directed at them, and the proletarians would gladly have bought
bourgeois art if they had had the money…the halls in bourgeois homes are
full of proletarian furniture and objects, like sleeping mats, cane-bottomed
chairs, clay pots and tin candlesticks; whereas a worker, as soon as he had
money enough to furnish his house, buys a Pullman sofa in heavy velvet, a
breakfast set, or a set of those extra rare pieces of furniture built of nickelplated iron tubings, thick crystals, and beveled mirrors (94).
Early on then Orozco began to feel somewhat cynical toward the lofty aspirations of the
artists around him, or at least about their capacity (and his own) to paint and support the
Revolution while remaining artistically honest.
Artistically, then, perhaps the qualifying difference between the three muralists lies in
the purpose of their respective arts. Rivera understood his murals in a directly political way,
and sought primarily to create a strong effect on the people. He offered a vision of the ideal,
of what they should be working and fighting for. His works are not a reflection of society,
but an explication of its ills and their potential cure. He trusts the people to find inspiration
in his work and fight to bring about the utopia he predicts (Rochfort 81).
Siqueiros’ motives were similar. His work differed in its focus from that of Rivera,
yet he nonetheless wanted to inspire a reaction among the people that would lead to the
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creation of a Mexican Communist golden age. Where Rivera wanted to inspire change and
progress, Siqueiros wanted to provoke pain and rebellion. His arguably most famous
painting, The Torment of Cuauhtemoc, provides an excellent example of this. The painting is
shocking, providing a stark contrast between the pathetic, human, and very relatable martyrs
on the torture table and the anonymous, mechanical Europeans watching. The look on
Cuauhtemoc’s tortured face of stoicism in the midst of unbearable pain would excite
sympathy and outrage in any viewer. The pathos of the scene is increased for those who
know the story, wherein Cuauhtemoc, Moctezuma’s nephew, was the last member of the
Aztec nobility to attempt to rally his people against the Europeans. Where Moctezuma gave
up quickly, for various reasons, Cuauhtemoc wanted to fight. However he was unsuccessful,
and in this painting Siqueiros points out the tragedy and injustice of his end, using it to
suggest the mortification and victimization of all of Mexico.
Both Rivera and Siqueiros used their art as a medium of communication and
inspiration—they wanted it to have real results in the physical, preferably political, world.
Both were affiliated with the Indianist movement, passionate about the Revolution, and
working to inspire it into a full, righteous, frenzy that would ultimately result in a better
world than the one they saw around them (Rochfort 93, 201).
But Orozco goes his own way. If Rivera presents a cure to the generalized ills of his
country as diagnosed by Siqueiros, Orozco lingers over the nature of the disease in an
attempt to do it justice. His depictions are not black and white. His approach to the
Conquest is always, at best, ambivalent. His Cortez is terrifying, but no more so than his
departing, furious Quetzalcoatl or his blank-faced, stern-featured Aztecs. And he wasn’t so
much of a Marxist as to trust the people to make good decisions, either in government or in
art. He found the more popular art of his day to be simplistic, benign, and ineffective. As he
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puts it: “Art interests everybody but unfortunately non-art interests everybody equally as
much, if not more. The world is bursting with vulgarities known and enjoyed by millions of
people in every land. The worst movies last longest” (99).
He refused to create the sort of “diabetic art…the greater the amount of sugar, the
greater the—commercial—success...” (99) that the people approved. For Diego Rivera (who
was, incidentally, the most successful of the three in his lifetime) there was no problem.
Generalities always ran in favor of his purposes. This applied also to Siqueiros—the more
black and white the morality of the situation, the more dramatic and effective the art. But
Orozco was searching for something more than ideals and progressive history. He was
searching for the meaning in history, for something universal, which would go beyond the
application (and manipulation) of history’s stories for political purposes. He was searching
for something as complex as the arc of human suffering itself.
This longer view was not welcomed by everybody. Ultimately Orozco was no fiery
radical, which was a disappointment to those revolutionaries who wanted to lionize him
beside his fellow muralists. He discusses, with his usual dry humor, the mythology that rose
up about his war service. In fact, he never served in the Revolution at all but spent the time
in the United States:
I played no part in the Revolution, I came to no harm, and I ran no
danger at all…It was consequently very funny to read the many articles that
American papers published about my wartime adventures. A headline in one
San Francisco daily ran, “The Bare-Footed Soldier of the Revolution.”
Another paper gave the most minute details of my differences with Carranza,
who, it seems, was persecuting me implacably for satirical attacks upon him.
The most fantastic report of all was a dramatic account of how I had lost my
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left hand while throwing bombs in a terrible encounter between Villistas and
Zapatistas….Other stories had me carrying the banner of the Indian cause,
and these were accompanied by a picture of my person in which I could
recognize a Tarahumara (41).
Orozco had lost his hand as a child in an accident. Beneath his sense of humor,
Orozco had little tolerance for the thoughtless frenzy of the Revolution. He often found
himself as appalled by the misplaced enthusiasms of the revolutionaries as by the abundant
excesses of the dominant class, and he saw the complexities of history too well to share in
the fervor of his contemporaries. An honest approach to culture would not be found,
Orozco believed, either in an impossible return to a romanticized past or in a heedless
mechanical march toward the future. For Orozco, an honest approach would entail
critiquing the present, in all its flaws and glory, and considering honestly the history that
preceded it. He didn’t trust the progressive narratives of Siqueiros and Rivera to be honest.
He felt they were misrepresentations and, as he put it, “History is subject to truly surprising
and disconcerting corrections” (42). So he spent his days and nights not in battle, not
feverishly writing revolutionary texts (or painting revolutionary murals), but wandering the
city, watching the people.
Orozco’s ambivalence toward his fellow revolutionaries provides the perfect analogy
to his art. Able to see the perspectives of both Indian and Spaniard, able to appreciate the
beauty brought from the Old World without forgetting the suffering inflicted upon the new,
his art can never be strictly propagandistic as it will satisfy neither side. But his instinctive
cynicism about the solutions offered by Indianism counter-balanced by his disdain for the
racist claims of Hispanism allow Orozco to meditate in his paintings on the good and the
bad of human experience itself, with Mexico as the stage. Orozco’s murals, like those of his
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contemporaries, are a manifestation of a larger movement toward a new sense of Mexican
identity. But for Orozco the details, the messy things, the things that don’t work, hold the
most interest. In studying these things, in considering them rather than denying them, the
anxiety produced in modernity by the prospect of death and suffering can be faced and
perhaps, resolved.
The pretensions of progress, embodied in both the Conquest and the ideology of
Indianism, to create (or re-create, for the nostalgic Indianists) a new and improved world
become secondary in this pursuit, particularly since, based on the pattern of the murals, in
Orozco’s view those pretensions had largely failed anyway. In the interpretation in the first
section of this chapter, the critique the murals offer of Orozco’s time, of modernity itself,
can be taken thus: the attempt to eradicate suffering and death is misguided. While not
diminishing its tragedy, suffering is inevitable and even definitive of human experience.
Therefore, the task of re-imbuing suffering and death with meaning that will take away its
terror becomes crucial. This kind of meaning, present in Rivera’s painting and progressively
diminishing throughout Orozco’s, can be found only through context.
This context takes many forms, the most valuable of which are those furthest from
human creation or comprehension, such as a sense of the holy which can’t be described, or
an interaction with the reality of nature which can never fully be explained. For Heidegger,
these two things are intimately related (Young 93 – 94). Only in the unsettling but beautiful
context of the non-human can the human really exist meaningfully, and the experience of
suffering be given significance.

Chapter II
Modernity and the Bad Death
Having explored the murals themselves and some of Orozco’s background and
artistic motivations, I now turn toward the more philosophical questions a Heidegerrian
interpretation of his art poses. The question for this next chapter is how to understand the
difference between Orozco’s two sufferers? Where the one is in frenzied yet smothered
agony, the first lies still in his captors’ arms. The one is utterly isolated, the other in contact
with men and his god. Why this difference, when both are undergoing terrible suffering and
death?

Context and Dwelling
The primary thematic difference between the two portraits is their respective time
frame. Orozco seems to suggest some quality that creates these different deaths. This
quality is present in the violence of both paintings, but seems to become significantly worse
in the second. The murals do not fully condemn modernity, of course, and Orozco would
seem to admit, at least in his ambiguous portraits of Anglo-America and Cortez, that the
modern worldview has certainly led to many benefits. However, they also suggest that such
advances have not released humanity from its cycle of suffering. To be clear, Orozco would
not embrace this; he would probably lament it. The murals are not depicting a masochistic
or self-flagellating road to morality. They are acknowledging the recurrence of suffering and
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death in the human drama. But they also seem to suggest that something in modern times
has led to a deeper loss of the ability to calmly face suffering.
In considering why this might be, the paintings can be taken to imply that the
experience of suffering is somewhat dependent upon its context. This statement is not
shocking, and real-life examples of this are easy to find. To pick one at random, certain
tribes in Africa practice ritual scarification in the name of aesthetic beauty. This purpose of
aesthetics makes the practice far more tolerable for the individuals who undergo it.
However if a Western woman were subjected to such practices, she would almost certainly
feel deeply abused and wronged. Other examples of suffering made bearable or even
desirable by contextual beliefs include: footbinding, circumcision (both male and female),
high heels, tweezing, plastic surgery, dying for one’s country, and many others. Significantly,
this paper is not taking a moral stance on any of these practices, although some may merit it.
However the author withholds her opinions because the point of this paper lies not in the
politics but in the philosophy (although the two may inevitably intersect in practical life).
Still, these occurrences seem to prompt a second look at the experience of suffering and the
power of a context that makes certain forms of it not only bearable, but even desirable, while
others not at all. In short, how does context take the terror away from pain?
Martin Heidegger offers an answer. While the extension of Heidegerrian thought to
ethical and social matters is still somewhat questioned, his later thought is particularly
relevant to a discussion of suffering because he deals with the very question of ‘the good
death.’ This ‘good death’ is defined principally in terms of ‘dwelling,’ a concept that merits
further exploration.
For Heidegger, ‘dwelling’ can only be understood if first it is accepted that human
experience is quintessentially relational. For Heidegger the self does not exist as an
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independent subject at all. Rather the self finds itself in things, as a physical reflection is
found in a mirror. It finds itself in things because it is so heavily involved with them in its
everyday life, it cannot escape them, it cannot exist without them. Therefore for Heidegger,
the kind of introverted, meditative self-reflection some influential (notably Cartesian)
philosophies espouse cannot lead to true self-knowledge, which is necessary for dwelling.
The self does not and cannot exist independent of its world:
[The self] never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves,
and in fact in those things that daily surround it. It finds itself primarily and
constantly in things because, tending them, distressed by them, it always in
some way or other rests in things. Each one of us is what he pursues and
cares for (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 159).
This passage suggests two valuable things: not only does it reinforce the concept that
humans should be considered as relational beings, finding themselves in relationships between
‘individuals’ and things, but also that these relationships are characterized by the quality of
“caring for.” This relational ontology can’t help but be a direct challenge to the ontology of
modernity, as Young writes “’Man dwells,’ should be taken as a purposeful revision of
Descartes’ ‘Man is a rational being’” (Young 38).
It seems that the ontology of modernity, then, would be a good place to begin the
study of what in modernity precludes Orozco’s second figure from suffering a ‘good death.”
Young writes:
[An important symptom of modernity] is man’s inability to ‘own’
death, the consequence of which…is that our fundamental way of being in
the world is anxiety. We are, in a fundamental sense, insecure. Since we
cannot own death, and since pain is an intimation of death, we cannot own
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pain either (Young 89).
Young, after Heidegger, affirms that one central problem of modernity is the
inability to own, or accept (this does not imply desire), death. Because death, and
pain with it, remains inevitable and even central to the human experience, the
inability to own it creates an unresolved difficulty in the modern mind, leading to a
state of anxiety. In these terms, the figure in the second panel is in just such a state
of ‘anxiety,’ because his modern culture forbids him from owning his death. In the
first panel the figure seems calmer. He could even have offered himself as a
sacrifice, as some sacrificial victims allegedly did in Aztec practice. Perhaps this last
speculation goes too far, but whatever the circumstances that brought him to the
stone table, like Rivera’s figure, he owns his death. And therefore he is secure, even
in the face of it. This security is implied by the earlier-discussed serenity of the
scene, including the warm colors, flowing lines, and the symmetry of its
organizational X-structure. It is also implied by the almost content expression on his
face, and his cooperative stillness on the table. Granted, he is being restrained by
two priests, but they only hold one arm and his head in place. His right arm, legs,
and torso are unrestrained, cooperative.
The reason the first figure owns his death and the second does not is because the
first figure exists relationally. He is held by his priests at the feet of his god, who embodies
both nature and the divine (perhaps the two should not be separated in this context).
Heidegger defines dwelling in just this way: dwelling involves living in a state of “caring-for”
among what Heidegger calls the “fourfold”: Earth, Sky, Gods, and Mortals (The Thing 179).
In Heidegger’s language, this signifies human interaction with nature, time and/or weather, a
sense of a deity or of the holy, and fellow humans. He nuances the fourfold more deeply
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than this, but for the purposes of this thesis the above definition is sufficient. The first
figure interacts with these things in his death, caring-for them and being cared-for by them.
He could be described as Young describes the security of the dweller:
The ultimate threat to one’s security is, of course, death; death
understood as annihilation, nothingness. So if one experiences oneself as
ultimately—‘ontologically’ one might put it—secure, then one experiences
oneself as secure even in the face of death. One confronts death, that is, not
with fear but rather with—to use a favorite word of Heidegger’s—gelassenheit,
equanimity…such an initiation, Heidegger continues, is by no means a
coming-to-terms with annihilation but is, rather, an overcoming of the
thought that death, the terminus or ‘goal’ of life, is an ‘empty nothing’
(Young 65).
In these terms, the second figure’s ordeal becomes clearer. He interacts with no one, caresfor and is cared-for by nothing. His death becomes an “empty nothing.”
For purposes of reference, then, let dwelling be defined in this way: a way of beingin-the-world whose fundamental attitude is care, both caring-for others and being cared-for.
The term ‘others’ includes not only other humans, but also Heidegger’s fourfold. As such
this attitude is fundamentally relational, and cannot be lived out in isolation. This attitude
alone allows the human to face pain, suffering, and even death with what Heidegger calls
“equanimity.”

The Solitude of Modernity
Now that the characteristic of dwelling has been explored in an effort to
explain the more peaceful appearance of the first figure’s death, it is worth asking
what exactly prevents the second figure from achieving the same. The order of
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Orozco’s works suggests that it is not merely a moral failing on the part of the figure,
a failure to ‘reach out’ perhaps, but something systematic and inherent, unique to the
modern age. Heidegger calls this modern quality that prevents dwelling “Gestell.”.
This term can be, and often is, loosely translated as “enframing.” The implication of
this term is something that places reality into a frame, that determines its
interpretation. Heidegger also calls these ‘frames’ horizons, meaning systems of
cultural norms that determine how individuals interpret information from the world.
For Heidegger, all cultures and all eras have these horizons. What, then, is sets the
nature of this enframing quality of modernity apart, and why does it prevent the
second figure from dwelling?
The history of the development of the set of beliefs here referenced under the broad
term ‘modernity’ or, more accurately, modernity’s quality of Gestell, is a long and complicated
one. Much criticism of the modern system has come from the field of sociology, and
prominent British sociologist Anthony Giddens offers a usefully concise definition:
At its simplest, modernity is a shorthand term for modern society or
industrial civilization. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a
certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to
transformation by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic
institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy; (3) a
certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass
democracy… (94)
Related to and considerably influenced by Renaissance humanism, modernity is in a broad
sense a set of beliefs that focuses on human power and prerogatives almost exclusively.
Giddens suggests that modernity has led to the rise of the economic institution of capitalism,

48
and that the tenets of modernity and the tenets of capitalism cannot be separated. Further,
these beliefs are at the roots of various modern political institutions, which, Giddens states,
include the nation and ideas of democracy. While both capitalism and democracy will play a
part in this discussion, the fundamental belief of modernity that both theorists describe and
that this paper will consider is this: that the world can and should be shaped by humans. This belief
by definition presupposes a human ability to understand the world in order to be justified in
acting upon it.
As a useful second definition of modernity, Leslie Paul Thiele gives some history to
the term:
The term modernist was first used in the sixteenth century, often
pejoratively, as a reference to someone who spurned tradition and advocated
either new techniques of scientific inquiry or the study and use of vernacular
languages rather than classical Greek or Latin. Breaking the chains of
tradition, modernists assumed, would progressively liberate humankind,
allowing it to claim its birthright as master of its world. Modernism was, and
remains today, chiefly characterized by rapid innovation in the service of
human power and prerogatives (Thiele 491).
Thiele concurs then with Giddens’ description of the strictly human parameters of
modernity, and its aspiration to master its environment. He also adds that modernity
includes an attempt to distance itself from tradition and myth.
As far as these definitions go, modernity might seem to be rather harmless, even
beneficial. And few if any of critics would deny the good things that have been
accomplished in the modern age. However, one problem with such progressive views on
the supremacy of humanity is that the concept of suffering takes a back-burner, becomes, as
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Young writes, something to be evaded. This is problematic because precisely this disregarding
of the experience of suffering, the evasion of or inability to own death, as it were, renders
Orozco’s second panel so much more terrifying than the first. Yet this evasion is common
in, for Young even definitive of, modernity. In his discussion of the topic, Young includes a
relevant and somewhat humorous anecdote:
In the mid-1990s there occurred, on New Zealand television, a preelection debate between party leaders on the topic of health. The members
of the live audience were given electronic devices which enabled them to
respond with varying degrees of favour or disfavour to what the participants
were saying, as they were saying it. The cumulative result was displayed as a
kind of constantly fluctuating graph-line at the bottom of the screen which
was known as ‘the worm’. At one point, the incumbent prime minister, Jim
Bolger (a Catholic), exasperated at constant carping over the failures of the
health system, expostulated: “Of course, death will always be associated with
the health service.” The worm hit an all-time low and Bolger went on to lose
his parliamentary majority (79).
How did masses of people in Western cultures get so out of touch with reality? The
history of this development is worth tracing.

Enlightenment
The humanism discussed by Giddens and Thiele, so exclusive to human parameters,
was molded during the reinterpretation of Renaissance humanism that occurred in the
Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. And, like those behind Renaissance humanism,
the motives behind the science and thought systems of the eighteenth century are hardly
bad. Indeed, its roots lie in the very difficulty that inspires this paper, suffering.
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Susan Nieman traces early Enlightenment thought to the experience of Alfonso X of
Castile, who, after years of studying history was heard to mutter, “If I had been of God’s
counsel at the Creation, many things would have been ordered better” (15). This assertion
brought condemnation in his time, as it presumed to question the order of the creation, but
later it sparked the sympathy of the Enlightenment movement (15). The Enlightenment
thinkers saw the humanism and logic of modernity, and particularly the new methods of
science they were developing, as a means toward improving the human condition. Appalled
by centuries of what seemed to them chaos and gratuitous pain, by the plague, the
Inquisition, the wars between Protestants and Catholics, and other tribulations of humanity
(some of them wrote great lists of the ills that might have been prevented), the
Enlightenment was a call to alleviate human suffering, to improve education, and to raise
humanity above the bestial level.
Enlightenment thinker Marquis de Condorcet serves as a representative and
articulate example of his age. A mathematician, scientist, and philosopher who studied
under d’Alembert, he was a free thinker who involved himself in politics at many levels. He
spoke out against slavery and in favor of women’s rights. A firm believer in the progressive
tenets of the Enlightenment, some of his more famous essays (at least of the non-scientific
variety) include “The Perfectibility of Man,” and “The Future Progress of the Human
Mind.” In this latter he writes almost joyfully:
So…we are bound to believe that the average length of human life
will forever increase unless this is prevented by physical revolutions; we do
not know what the limit is which it can never exceed…Finally may we not
extend such hopes to the intellectual and moral faculties? May not our
parents, who transmit to us the benefits or disadvantages of their
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constitution, and from whom we receive our shape and features as well as
our tendencies to certain physical affections, hand on to us also that part of
the physical organization which determines the sensibility? Is it not probably
that education, in perfecting these qualities, will at the same time influence,
modify and perfect the organization itself? Analogy, investigation of the
human faculties, and the study of certain facts all seem to give substance to
such conjectures, which would further push back the boundaries of our
hopes. (Condorcet 38)
The faith of the Marquis and his celebration of human progress (for him always
allied with science) are inspiring, even convincing in his works. His optimism and energy
embody the spirit of his age. Further, for the Marquis, the gullibility and ignorance of the
past had been responsible for the terrible crimes and human suffering his contemporaries
were attempting to understand. So, logically, once that demon was exorcised, perhaps
suffering could be as well.
The roots of the attitude of poor Prime Minister Bolger’s audience should be starting
to shine through. Although it has been three hundred or so years since the Enlightenment,
the humanist, progressive perspective on reality established then remains in many ways
dominant. Of course the idea of one or two centuries creating such a wild sea change is a bit
too convenient to be quite on the mark—the Enlightenment’s roots can likely be traced back
in time indefinitely (Alfonso X lived in the thirteenth century), and its influence since the
eighteenth century has been as complex. However, it remains fair to say that the modernity
of the present was deeply shaped by the thinkers of the Enlightenment, and still treasures
many of the values first embraced in the eighteenth century. Modernity firmly agrees with
Condorcet’s idea of human moral progression aided by science, and tends to view the time
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since his day in precisely those terms. It revels in the progressive advances of the Western
world in terms of technology and in the extension of human rights and freedoms. These
advances have brought power and comfort to large sections of humanity that would never
have had such advantages in another time—certainly not in such numbers.
It shouldn’t be difficult to sense an approaching critique of this attitude.
However before this path is taken, acknowledging that Heidegger, Giddens, and
Orozco are not opposed to humanism in itself is important. All of them believe in
the supremacy of the human within a larger chain of being. The criticisms to be
explored do not embrace a system of thought that would demote humans, nor will
they include luddism as a solution. As Young puts it:
There is nothing wrong, that is, in seeking understanding and
therefore a measure of control over reality. Though the ability to control
can, of course, become abuse, as when it becomes control for the sake of
‘unconditional’ exploitation, it can also be the opposite. One cannot care-for
a delicate ecological system unless one knows how it works and what the
forces are that threaten to destroy it (Young 79).
The search for knowledge and the pursuit of change for the better are not the targets of
critics of modernity. Nor even the honor given to humans over other creatures or things,
exactly. Rather the exclusivity of the focus of these pursuits constitutes Gestell. Heidegger will
argue this exclusivity is not only misguided but also fatal for both the world and humans as
beings who can only “dwell” relationally.

Science and Reductionism
An analysis of the phenomenon of science in greater detail can better supply what
within modernity is the true target of this critique. Naturally, science played a crucial role in
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the quest to alleviate suffering, even acting as the primary distinguishing factor between the
humanism of the eighteenth century and that of the Renaissance. Under the influence of
earlier scientists such as Descartes, Newton, and Bacon, many thinkers of the Enlightenment
put their hopes in a technological world that could shake humanity free of its reliance upon
what they saw as the ignorant and destructive superstitions of the Middle Ages.
Perhaps the flaw of this project can be defined simply and appropriately by
Newton’s scientific method. This method states that taking context into account in
the pursuit of truth is not only irrelevant but irresponsible: “We are to admit no
more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain
their appearances” (Newton 45). This perspective is generally central to the project
of science, where only an object of study can only be understood by reducing it to its
singularity and controlling for all contextual factors. John Deely describes this in his
analysis of the Cartesian system: “In other words, what is proposed as novel in the
Cartesian system is the system itself, in particular the method of analysis of objects
into their simplest components, buttressed by methodical doubt maintained at each
step of the way (54).
A protest might here be lodged that indeed, Newton’s method is the best and most
efficient in the search for material facts. Further, not all scientific pursuits, especially
recently, are defined by Newton’s statement. Certain fields, including ecology (significantly)
in some cases seem to positively subvert it. However, both of these objections speak to the
problem. Newton’s statement may well be the best method for finding truth, but only
within a material realm. And if science has in some fields left Newton’s statement behind, it
still maintains a strong cultural hold. The problem is two fold: it lies first not in the
application of the scientific method to science, but in its extension into other realms, indeed
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into all facets of modern culture; secondly, it lies in the pretension to utter objectivity.
Science often presumes not only the power to describe what can be positively seen (as in
positivism), but also the authority to discount what cannot. This reduction-towardsknowledge alters the way reality itself is perceived—it reduces it, in short, to what is
scientifically relevant and discards what isn’t, without acknowledging that it acts itself as an
interpretive, and not merely descriptive, device. It “enframes” it. Young writes:
What it misses is…the fact that there are just these universal traits
which have categorical status for us is dependent on the selection made from
the smorgasbord of attributes possessed by reality itself which is made by the
linguistic practices, the forms of life, with which we live, and move, and have
our being. And missing that, missing, not our horizon of disclosure but
rather its horizonal character—the perspectival character of our basic
perspective on things—it elevates its account of the being of beings into the
(one and only) categorical account of reality itself….it elevates (what is in
fact) a particular disclosure to tyrannical status, a status which allows the
possibility of no other reality-revealing itself. I shall refer to this
phenomenon as “absolutization”. As Heidegger uses the term, the error that
is [Gestell] may be defined as the absolutization of some (of any) horizon of
disclosure (29).
Beyond the tyrannical absolutization of its own perspective as truth, the science of
modernity also extends beyond its proper realm, attempting to explain things it simply
cannot, and discounting them in that inevitable event. Carman offers some further nuances
on this cultural hold, and the problems of extending scientific thought and method outside
of the realms of science:
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Heidegger is not trying (incoherently) to contradict the law of noncontradiction, but rather insisting that traditional logic is of no positive
guidance in asking the question of being. What Heidegger calls the
“hegemony” of logic is not its legitimate authority over formal judgment and
inference, but its false promise to provide substantive metaphysical insight
into fundamental, if still only semi-articulate, philosophical questions (568).
This promise of metaphysical answers is problematic not only because scientific
thought fails to actually provide such answers, and too often presumes to discount
the questions, but also because, in Heidegger’s terms, it changes the very perception
humans have of their world. Young argues that the perspective of science, when
extended, far from being truly empirical actually reshapes the world for the observer
as such that it forbids dwelling (77).
For Young and Heidegger, this cultural reductionism, inherited from scientific
pursuits, complicates dwelling partially because scientific thought and method have largely
come to underlie truth-claims in all sectors of society. It is not uncommon to find members
of a religion trying to justify their beliefs scientifically, or philosophers and scholars trying to
prove the importance of their pursuits in scientific terms. Science has become a cultural
value, exceeding its prescribed realm of the physical and material, bringing values of
reductionism into the cultural ‘hegemony of logic’ Heidegger derides (Young77).
Nietzsche sums up the difficulties with the over-extension of scientific thought most
poetically in The Gay Science:
We say [scientific knowledge] is ‘explanation;’ but it is only in
‘description’ that we are in advance of the older stages of knowledge and
science. We describe better, we explain just as little as our predecessors…the
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series of ‘causes’ stands before us much more complete in every case; we
conclude that this and that must first precede in order that that other may
follow—but we have not grasped anything thereby. The peculiarity, for
example, in every chemical process seems a ‘miracle,’ the same as before, just
like all locomotion, but nobody has ‘explained’ impulse. How could we ever
explain? We operate only with things which do not exist, with lines, surfaces,
bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces—how can explanation ever be
possible when we first make everything a conception, our conception? It is
sufficient to regard science as the exactest humanizing of things that is
possible. . . (93).
The point, then, is this: scientific facts such as the quanta Nietzsche enumerates
(lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms), no matter how well documented and described, can never
add up to a whole that can explain all of human experience. They are useful, certainly, in
their way, and Nietzsche was no more a luddite than was Heidegger. However they will
never be sufficient to generate the necessary ‘mystery,’ to use Heidegger’s terms, because in
this exact humanization of things, domination and control is the motivation, not the respect
or caring-for that dwelling demands.

Science and Absolutization
One of the more important claims that Heidegger makes is that rather than
documenting the world as it is, science shapes the world to its demands, without
acknowledging it is doing so. It is an absolute absolutization. This is the quality of
enframing. Yet this accusation would be outrageous to science, and against its very
principles. As Young mentions, the central goal of science is to describe the world in its
“ownness,” or as it actually is (79n). Scientific pursuits (and Western ideas about ontology in
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general) are built on this theory of truth as correlation—that is, the idea that things can be
known as they are. For example if I were to point at a tree and say “That tree is green,” the
observer could look at the tree and observe whether or not it is so. For science, truth is that
simple. Presumably the tree was green before one pointed at it. But Young, using a similar
example involving a horse named Betty, explains how even such a simple communication
can become complicated if considered more thoroughly:
The mere correlation of words with bits of reality—merely saying
‘Betty stands for that’ and pointing—is insufficient to determine reference.
Normally, of course, communication flows smoothly and we do not suffer
from the kinds of misunderstandings illustrated by these examples.
Communication is usually unproblematic. But that is only because we share
a—usually unnoticed—background understanding as to the kinds of entities
that are being talked about. Generally, for example, we share the assumption
that the things named and pointed to are whole natural objects rather than
their surfaces or the spaces they occupy. What these far-fetched examples
reveal, however, is that it is only because of such a background assumption
that we know what kinds of things, and hence what kinds of facts, are under
discussion. Heidegger calls such a background understanding a ‘horizon of
disclosure’ (of ‘revealing’, ‘unconcealment’). Sometimes, echoing Nietzsche,
he calls it a ‘perspective.’ (Young 7)
Whether we are scientists pointing at green trees or ancient Aztecs performing a
human sacrifice, the world is determined not by a simple correlation between the senses and
reality, but by a defining cultural horizon of disclosure that determines what our filter on the
world permits to be disclosed to the human mind.
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And truly, science could not be possible without such a unified perspective on the
world that, if Heidegger is correct, both limits and shapes what can be perceived. However,
the flaw does not lie in just having this perspective. Indeed, all times and places are defined
by these cultural perspectives, and it is not possible, or even particularly desirable for
Heidegger, to escape them. The flaw of Gestell lies in having this perspective exclusively—in
the refusal to acknowledge other methods of finding truth, or the importance of the
questions it cannot answer. While explanation may have been replaced with description,
description necessarily still masquerades as explanation. When it cannot explain, it
discounts, and thus precludes the possibility of a more meaningful explanation. This is part
of the destructiveness of Heidegger’s ‘enframing.’
However, this inconsistency is only part of the problem with science and modernity
in general, although understanding that science is defined by a horizon or disclosure and not
an objective examination of reality is pertinent. Once science is acknowledged to be the
result of a horizon of disclosure, the nature of that modern horizon should become clearer.
And the news is not good—the horizon of disclosure that defines Western society, and its
central pursuit of science, is not actually science or technology at all, but Gestell:
Young says that in the age of Gestell (enframing):
What is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but
does so, rather, exclusively as resource. This suggests that while beings show
up in every age as resource, the ‘way’ they show up that is unique to
modernity is as pure resource, nothing but resource. ..We might say that
modernity is the epoch in which world-disclosure is such that to be is to be
nothing but resource. This formula…is confirmed by Heidegger’s well-known
image of the world’s showing up to modernity as ‘a gigantic petrol station.’
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The point about petrol stations being not that they are resources but that
they are nothing but resources. There is nothing to them other than their
resource-fulness, no being other than their being-as-resource. Petrol stations
are, in a certain sense, one-dimensional places (which, to anticipate, has
something to do with their charmlessness)… (Young 50).
According to Heidegger, the very nature of Gestell, of modernity, is violent
because it refuses to acknowledge things in any way outside of its own enframing,
which is based on things-as-resources. This seeing all things, humans included,
merely in terms of resource, constitutes an act of violation. Young uses this to
explain the violent nature of Gestell:
…violation is essential harm, harm to the ‘essence’ of
something…Violation is, in one way or another and to one degree or
another, preventing something being (or becoming) what it is. A woman is
violated when she finds herself forced to live not as a person but as a mere
sex object—a mere sexual ‘resource’—a forest, an intricately wrought and
finely balanced ecological system, is violated when its exploitation as timber
no longer allows it to be the ecological system that it is…(52 – 53).
Still more dangerous, because of Gestell’s specific enframing of reality-asresource, it has no system for understanding this kind of violation. Young states that
if everything in the world is seen merely as a resource, as a tool, even the concept of
violation disappears. “It is not wrong to push a hammer to its limits or even break
it” (53).
According to Young, the position of science that nothing can be known save
by its method, including answers to metaphysical questions, enframes reality in such
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a way that qualities that science has not yet learned how to explain are discounted—
this constitutes a violation of what is being considered, as its qualities that are not
useful as resource are ignored. Things that science has described, if defined
exclusively in terms of Nietzsche’s atoms, lines, surfaces, etc. are violated since they
are enframed in such a way that their ‘whatness’ is not allowed to shine through.
This violation is Gestell, the qualifying point of modernity.

Luddism?
This discussion, then, is not meant to discredit scientific pursuits—they are useful
and even essential in many ways to human existence. For Heidegger, man is inherently a
technological animal and, save for a short period of luddism in his earlier days, he does not
advocate the destruction of machines or technology. Young writes:
The crucial point is that knowledge and the capacity for control that
it brings are, in themselves, neutral phenomena. It is what we do with them
that counts. Of course, if Heidegger is right (as he is) about the character of
modernity in general, then modern natural science is, in fact, part of an
enterprise of exploitation and violation (Young 79).
Rather than discredit science, this discussion has sought to clarify the concept of Gestell—
absolutization is not something inherent in scientific pursuits, but because it defines Western
culture, it defines Western science.
And, in a sort of relational reciprocity that Heidegger might have predicted,
perceiving the world as nothing but resource results in perceiving other humans as nothing
but resource. The “enterprise of exploitation and violation” is a self-perpetuating cycle,
which converts or destroys all it touches since, if the value of something cannot be explained
in terms of the values of Gestell, that is, as resource, then it will be destroyed. If something
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can be explained in those terms, then it has already been converted to the same destructive
system. An example of this could be the argument that wild spaces should be preserved
because they lessen air pollution. Possibly wild spaces are beneficial in any horizon of
disclosure, but in these terms, they have just been reduced to air filters, and nothing more.
They become a part of Gestell. However saying they should be preserved because they
provide a source of caring-for for humans looking to dwell relationally, or even further
removed, that they should be valued for their ‘ownness’, for their ‘treeness,’ would never fly
in the politics of ‘the real world,’ that is, of Gestell.

Critiques of Modernity
Young and Heidegger’s are not alone in cataloging the damages of Gestell—even in
terms of suffering and the anxiety caused by its evasion. While older fears and problems
have perhaps been largely corrected through science, medicine, technology, and the clever (if
not careful) use of resources, the humanist perspective that defeated them has now come
under fire from many angles. As modernity neglects to take into account its own contingent
nature, it contradicts its own aspirations. While it espouses openness to all rational voices,
the one qualifier of “rational” keeps modernity’s quest for knowledge firmly entrenched
within cultural boundaries, in this case the horizonal limit of what is considered a rational
voice (an adjective that has been notoriously mobile).
Indeed, the damage done by modernity is now a common topic in scholarly
literature. Eminent sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has tied the tenets of modernity to the
methods and motivations of the Holocaustii, while Immanuel Wallerstein discusses the links
between modernity, colonialism, and exploitationiii. There are many other prominent
thinkers who further nuance this idea, examining the ways that modernity undermines
systems of ethics and communal meaning. In this stripped state, Heidegger compares the
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modern world to a “charmless” petrol station. Orozco’s rendition of modernity is chaotic,
yet static, mechanical and horrifying. Sociologist Max Weber coined the iconic phrase “the
disenchantment of the world (139)” to describe it, and Nietzsche and Heidegger both
discourse on the subject in terms of the boredom and malaise of modernity, while invoking
the reciprocal nature of Gestell discussed above:
Technology replaces the emptiness of Being revealed in the mood of
boredom with the production and consumption of artifacts and the
unrelenting manipulation of the world...the problem is not the human
creation and use of machines but rather the creation and use of human
machines—the making of ourselves into mere extensions of technological
forces and processes. Refusing to lay our hands on everything simply means
a halt to the imperial attitude which enframes everything, everywhere, as raw
material awaiting exploitation…Heidegger warns that no amount of
technological activity can satiate the existential hunger that it conspires to
ignore (Thiele 507).
In short, modernity by its nature creates a hunger that it cannot satisfy.

Anxiety in Modernity
Wendell Berry discusses the effects of Gestell in terms of anxiety. This seems
appropriate when considered with Heidegger’s assertion that one of the defining qualities of
Gestell is anxiety brought about by the evasion of death. Berry frames his argument in terms
of specialization in both work and thought. He claims this aspect of modern life isolates
humans and disrespects the world, and distances the two from each other. After a passage
discussing the anxieties of the modern individual (physical appearance, relationships, jobs,
money, kids, etc) Berry’s diagnosis of depression avoids the drive for a technological cure,
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but rather trusts the meaning of the symptoms:
It is rarely considered that this average citizen is anxious because he
ought to be – because he still has some gumption that he has not yet given
up in deference to the experts. He ought to be anxious, because he is
helpless. That he is dependent on so many specialists, the beneficiary of so
much expert help, can only mean that he is a captive, a potential victim. If
he lives by the competence of so many other people, then he lives also by
their indulgence; his own will and his own reasons to live are made
subordinate to the mere tolerance of everybody else. He has one chance to
live what he conceives to be his life: his own small specialty within a delicate,
tense, everywhere-strained system of specialties (21).
As the reliance upon specialization requires a certain reductive knowledge of one or two
small, specific things, the kind of dependence Berry discusses only increases an individual’s
vulnerability and limits his understanding and freedom.
Yet Berry’s move toward searching the symptoms of a disease (here, anxiety) for
clues to the real problem is the precise opposite of a modern, scientific solution. In an
earlier passage Berry discusses the ineffectuality of such resources as therapy and
antidepressants, at least in terms of the larger problem. They may treat the symptoms
effectively enough, but they will never treat the disease. This becomes an excellent
metaphor for this issue.
Arlie Hochschild also discusses drugs and anti-depressants as she offers a more
concrete example of the transformation of human beings to standing reserve, to ‘nothing but
resource,’ in her study of flight attendants. Her work offers a discussion of the working
conditions of flight attendants and the considerable demands of the job, both emotional and
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physical. They are not only required to fulfill their duties in serving meals, seating the
passengers, and resolving disputes. Their greatest duty, they are told, is to maintain a certain
emotional facade that will create the illusion of comfort in the cabin (54 – 55). She describes
the isolation and confusion that comes from controlling emotions for market effect,
ultimately showing that the objectification of these functions leads to emotional and physical
breakdown (7).
But the airline has a solution for this. Hochschild describes the free anti-depressants
and muscle relaxers given to flight attendants to solve their stress problems, or, more
accurately, restore them to working order—all the while the emotional demands of the job
are ever increased. Like Berry, she suggests that emotions serve as a barometer of wellbeing, much like physical pain. Yet modernity specializes and commodifies them into a tool
or a product to be used for market purposes. When this commodification has an
undesirable effect on the product (the flight attendant) that limits its profitability, the
problem is “solved” through technology: pills and drugs. The ‘real problem’ of a stressful
and dehumanizing working environment is never even considered. Violation in this case
does not exist, not as long as there are pills and drugs to keep the flight attendants working.
The flight attendants become ‘nothing but resource’.
Indeed, she argues that this chemistry-based method of solving emotional problems
is not only ineffective, but also fundamentally misguided. She suggests that feelings are not
only a barometer of well-being, but a method of connection with the world. Feelings form a
crucial part of an individual’s ability to interact with an intersubjective world, to interpret a
situation’s context and live relationally, to care-for and to dwell, as Heidegger would have it.
But as workers’ feelings are objectified and commodified, the person becomes isolated from
them and so loses the ability to connect to the world around them. They become estranged:
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To manage private loves and hates is to participate in an intricate
private emotional system. When elements of that system are taken into the
marketplace and sold as human labor, they become stretched into
standardized social forms. In these forms, a persons’ contribution of feeling
is thinner, less freighted with consequence; but at the same time it is seen as
coming less from the self and being less direct to the other. For that reason
it is more susceptible to estrangement (Hochschild 13).
For Hochschild, not only are bodies, time, and labor sacrificed to the intangible and abstract
demands of a modernist labor system, but the very hearts and minds of the people are
commodified and distorted. The human self fragments, and the meaningful life and sense of
dwelling described by Heidegger becomes ever more elusive.
Finally, the metaphor of anti-depressants provides an excellent summary to this
section, which has attempted a more in-depth exploration of the problems with Gestell.
William S. Hamrick explores the issues with the exclusive use and overextension of
technology into solving all problems, physical, emotional, and cultural, and the sense of
isolation this creates in his excellent book Kindness and the Good Society:
A very different but related example of technological hegemony
consists of our constant tendency to rely on pills for solutions to personal
and social problems. Sometimes this can entail unkindness to oneself, as
when one can depend on pills to lose weight in order to avoid the selfdiscipline of eating the right amounts of sensible foods and getting
appropriate exercise. At other times, this technique of medicalizing the body
can lead to unkindness to others. For instance, pharmaceutical companies
are now spending billions of dollars to technologize aphrodisiacs. The aim is
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to guarantee great sex, even if – perhaps especially if – the participants do
not feel like it…in Marcel’s terms, sexuality would become degraded to one
(fast-paced) function among others. Correlatively, there is a risk of unkind
objectification, in that sexuality could be reduced to performance judged
quantitatively: duration, numbers of orgasms, how fast, how slow, and so
forth (108 – 109).
Hamrick’s analysis is relevant not only because of the dangers of the “unkindnesses”
of technology, but also because of the alienation (and violation) it implies—from the body,
from nature, from other people, and from the self. Relying entirely on pills or other forms
of technology to solve problems that extend beyond what technology can solve is a
symptom of a society that has lost touch with non-technological modes of being, with the
possibility of horizons of disclosure outside of Gestell.

Reciprocity
All of the approaches mentioned here, whether Berry’s anxiety, Hochschild’s
commodification, or Hamrick’s mechanization (of course all three are related) document the
practical difficulties and indignities of trying to survive as a human in a world that perceives
and is perceived as ‘nothing but resource.’ Finally, the problematic way-of-being offered by
Gestell can come into final focus through a discussion of some of the practical possibilities of
its proposed opposite, dwelling.
The dweller will, therefore, wish to preserve the presencing of the
holy rhythms in human life, in his own life and that of his fellows…He will
resist, for example, seven-day, twenty-four-hour shopping, the sixty-hour
working-week, tradable holidays…Accepting, enjoying, and communicating
the enjoyment of the seasonality of fruit and vegetables might be another
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example of passively caring-for sky. Dwellers do not demand a round-theyear supply of avocados (Young 111).
Now to be fair, all this may seem to present a rather extreme case. This paper is not
taking a stance against medication, and remains aware that therapy, a perhaps more
contextual, relational approach to depression, is still thriving. While the metaphor of antidepressants proves useful, once again the answer does not lie in “luddite techno-phobia.”
Rather technology, presumably including the use of pills and medications, can be
“incorporated into a life of dwelling” (Young 112).
To sum up this section, technology itself is not the problem, but the nature of Gestell.
And in these terms, ultimately Heidegger himself says it all:
Yet when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the
supreme danger. The danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as
what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but exclusively
as standing reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the
orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a
precipitous fall; that is he comes to the point where he himself will have to
be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so
threatened, exalts himself and postures as lord of the earth. In this way the
illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar
as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it
seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself (The
Question Concerning Technology 332).
The description of man’s higher position as “delusion” underlines Heidegger’s
discussion of the dangers of the assumption that man constructs and so controls everything.
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Not only is there a danger of humanity becoming ‘standing-reserve’ itself, although that is
certainly there (deeply ironic for a system that claims to value the human and the individual).
The real danger is that in encountering everywhere only himself, humanity loses the ability to
care for and be cared for by others—the ability to dwell.

Post-modernism
The movement, or set of movements, called post-modernism, are worth addressing
briefly as they may be offered as an alternative to the Gestell of modernity. Indeed,
sophisticated perceptions of this problem, or at least the idea that that there were problems
with the progressive optimism of the Enlightenment, date as far back as the Romantic
period and go on today. These are often grouped under the heading of ‘post-modernity.’
The appearance of a consciously post-modern, sometimes anti-modern school of thought,
and works that support it, is telling in itself. Of course, post-modernity is notoriously
difficult to define, not least because it actively resists definition. However generally
speaking, post-modern thought breaks down the singular voice of objective, often scientific,
authority espoused by modernity in favor of a more subjective point-of-view. To use the
Derridean term, it thrives on the idea of “play” (Derrida 14). And in terms of the critiques
made in the last section, it would appear to be taking positive steps. John Deely defines
postmodernism thus:
Post-modernism properly begins with a dawning realization that the
shift from being-narrowly-understood to discourse-equally-narrowlyunderstood, which took place at the beginning of modern times, was
something of a misbegotten choice. What was needed for philosophy to
mature was not so much a shift as an expansion, an expansion of the notion
of reality – and with it, being – to include the whole of experience as the
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prior ground off of which human understanding arises and on which it
throughout depends (19).
That is, post-modernity helpfully acknowledges the horizonal character of modernity and
Gestell, equating it with the narrow perspectives of the Middle Ages some Enlightenment
thinkers so vigorously condemned. It generally seeks to expand reality from the narrowly
defined terms of enframing into the whole of human experience.
These are not bad things, perhaps even steps in the right direction. However, for
many thinkers, it does not solve the problems presented by modernity. The very etymology
of the idea of post-modern thought is informative—it does not qualify as a new system of
thought, but functions on many of the same principles as modernity. While it’s true that it
often serves as the anti-modern, as something attempting to break away from modernity, its
arguments are nearly always made using the assumptions and language of modernity.
Bauman, mentioned earlier, refuses to use the term “post-modern” at all, preferring to refer
to the two periods as “solid modernity” and “liquid modernity” (23). He traces the
multivalency of post-modernity not to intellectual dissent, but largely to market forces, for
whom concepts of plurality, identity, and cliques provide the opportunity to sell more
products (137). He argues that true ethics, another way of putting Heidegger’s solution to
the problem of Gestell, is not even possible in a society so driven by consumerism (51 – 55).
John Deely finishes his book with a fairly typical assessment of the advantages of
post-modernity:
This new beginning labels itself “postmodern” for want of a better
name, since it knows in its nascence what it is against (modernity) more clearly
than what it will itself become. Positive features of postmodernity will be
acquired by advancing along the way of signs…The purpose of human life is
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to bring to expression the stories things are. In the telling is the living of our
lives as human. We are explorers and inquirers, and when society turns in
from that, it dooms itself to suffocation (248).
The movement, then, is not entirely negative. Scholarly inquiry into the nature of signs and
the role of stories in human life are particularly rich fields. Yet it does not address the
relationality Heidegger views as so crucial—even in this optimistic passage, the seeker of
truth is advised to turn further in upon herself, into the ‘way of signs.’ The study becomes
strictly introverted, continuing to peer behind the structures of things, to reduce them to
their components, not unlike science itself. Deely concludes this passage with a rousing
invitation to explore and inquire. He attributes these actions to human nature itself.
However, while these things are not bad in themselves, the language is saturated with the
imagery of modernity, of conquering and questing, of discovering truth by penetrating
mysteries—then of nature, now of language.
This paper is not the first to say that post-modernity plays out the same methods
and goals as modernity itself. François Lyotard offers a succinct discussion of this process
and the ensuing instability of such a system:
Simplifying to the extreme, I define post-modernism as incredulity
toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress
in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it…The narrative
function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great
voyages, its great goal…Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside
(24)?
Lyotard notes that although post-modern incredulity and skepticism is a natural product of
scientific progress (a product of modernity), it ultimately tends toward the dissolution of
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modernity’s cultural hegemony. However, with that dissolution comes the danger of losing
the ability to locate legitimacy anywhere, resulting in the same disenchanting results earlier
discussed. Thus neither modernism nor post-modernism are able to endow the world with
wonder, to make it compelling, to make its gods “shine” as Quetzalcoatl shines for Orozco,
as Christ himself shines at the end of the mural in his hopeful gesture toward the future.
Finally, the results of such a lack of legitimacy and the disenchantment that follow
are summed up aptly by Thiele:
Boredom is the basic mood of the technological age. It accompanies
another basic mood of the times—horror—a state of spiritual shell-shock
that, no less than boredom, paralyzes one in the face of utter
meaninglessness. Horror is an appropriate, but often repressed, reaction to
the experience of a nihilistic world in which everything is permitted. Its
relationship to boredom is complementary. A deep, pervasive boredom, a
boredom with life and being, may induce forms of nihilistic behavior…to
which horror seems the only appropriate, if ineffective, response (504).
The criticisms discussed in the previous section allege that modernity has caused
certain unique forms of suffering—nihilism, boredom, anxiety, even horror. It seems clear
then that the problem of suffering with which many of the Enlightenment thinkers struggled
still exists. This is evidenced in not only the continuation of the older forms of poverty and
physical deprivation, but also through these new forms—the nihilism, deep boredom, etc.
This is not to suggest that the problem of suffering is utterly insoluble, although it may be.
Heidegger offers a possible solution. Following the advice given in the previous section on
searching for root causes rather than just symptoms of a problem, it becomes important to
examine the possible causes of these new forms of suffering.
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Thiele gives a solid clue when he writes of boredom that: “It is an emotional and
spiritual paralysis that arises from the repression of anxiety or fear” (492 – 494). Whence
this anxiety and fear? Heidegger supposes that all of Gestell in fact comes about as a result of
the fear of death and the attempt to evade it. Young in turn writes that Berry’s anxious
humans allow the insecurities and the painful aspects of Gestell to continue because they
offer precisely that illusion: an escape from death. He writes:
The thought here, I suggest, examines the question as to why it is
that the modern human being, quite typically, is perfectly prepared to regard
not only others but also himself as a mere ‘human resource’, as a mere cog in
the global mechanisms of consumption and production, or, better put, a
mere information processor …
The important thing about information processors is that their
consciousness is entirely outwardly directed, directed to the task at hand.
Consciousness of mortality is, however, self-directed, inwardly directed,
consciousness. Hence, information processors do not have consciousness of
mortality, cannot fear death. Abandoning metaphor, to become nothing but
an obedient, efficient and reliable ‘human resource,’ in other words, a
‘workaholic,’ is to have a purely outer consciousness and therefore to evade
knowledge of mortality. The life of a ‘pure human resource’ thus presents
itself as a kind of narcotic, an evasion of mortality. ..submission to Gestell is,
then, yet another technique for evading ‘ownership’ of death (Young 67).
In these terms, the earlier discussion on the purpose and symbolism of
antidepressants and other pills becomes especially trenchant as humans themselves become
the narcotic desired. This reciprocity actually serves a function, however, as narcotics
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(resources, standing reserve, information processors or what have you) do not have to face
death. For a society so terrified and anxious of death, the price of modernity is not too high
to pay for such security.

Chapter III
The Turning
Here at last, this paper begins to retrace its steps. Beginning with a discussion of the
work of Orozco, the argument has leapt and bounded until it presumes to apply to all of
Western humanity since the Renaissance. It becomes necessary now to narrow, to seek out a
practical application of the theory and return to the question of Mexico and the art of
Orozco.

Mexico
This section will analyze Mexico because of its culture’s obvious influence on
Orozco, as well as because of how it represents a prime example of the flaws and failings, as
well as the benefits, of modernity. A direct product of the Conquest (arguably the inaugural
event of modernity) it offers in its culture and art a unique example of the struggle between
pre-modern cultures and modernity, as well as a history of exploring what might constitute a
successful post-modernity—in other words, what it might mean to dwell.
Orozco’s “Human Sacrifice in the Modern World” is not the only medium where
features of the modern human condition within the Mexican experience can be found.
Octavio Paz’ famous work The Labyrinth of Solitude makes a very similar analogy. He
compares the experience of the Mexican people to that of orphaned or bastard children (hijos
de la chingada). Paz uses this metaphor of children of a violated mother and an uncaring,
exploitative father to describe the cultural experience of Mexican nationality:
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Who is the chingada? Above all, she is the Mother. Not a Mother of
flesh and blood but a mythical figure. The chingada is one of the Mexican
representations of maternity, like La Llorona or the “long-suffering Mexican
mother” we celebrate on the tenth of May. The chingada is the mother who
has suffered – metaphorically or actually – the corrosive and defaming action
implicit in the verb that gives her her name… (75)
As a people of mixed race whose “mother” (the indigenous nations) was violated if
not totally destroyed, and whose “father” (the Spaniards) has only exploited and enslaved his
children, the Mexican people in the time of Orozco (although Paz would remark since the
Conquest) are rootless. Neither Spanish nor indigenous, the Mexican people for Paz live in
a sort of liminal space, both ashamed and proud, unable to embrace either side of their
heritage and uncertain of how to create something new. The cultural and geographical
disorientation of the Conquest has left them metaphorically homeless.

Homelessness vs. Dwelling
This issue of homelessness, while finding a unique and significant expression in
Mexico, is not unique to it. Many post-modern and post-colonial thinkers, including
Heidegger, have embraced the term to describe the conditions of modernity. And again, it is
a condition primarily defined by anxiety. Thiele finds these nuances when he traces the
etymology of the German word for anxiety: “Heidegger describes anxiety as ‘unheimlich’.
Translators have generally rendered this as ‘uncanny.’ The connotation of uneasy
strangeness is also present in the German. Literally, however, unheimlich means ‘un-homelike’” (500). The principle quality of homelessness then is this uneasy strangeness, this
uncanny sense of displacement, this anxiety. The anxiety of homelessness is, further, what
Heidegger judges to be the “plight” of modern humanity (“Building Dwelling Thinking”
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161).
In discussing the distress of homelessness, Heidegger makes much the same point as
Paz, on a pan-modern scale. The rootlessness and the solitude of modern experience, which
include for Heidegger especially the unhealthy evasion of suffering, reflects the experience of
a parentless child. This experience is neither entirely good nor entirely bad—there is a
freedom to homelessness in the lack of the burden of or responsibility to the past. The
freedom of modernity incorporates a focus on the future, and a positive versatility and
adaptability. However there is also a destructiveness and a sense of disorientation and
meaninglessness that accompany such a separation. The negative side of this freedom by
default entails a carelessness for places, people, and things— by definition the opposite of
dwelling. Homelessness, as a part of modernity, leads to anxiety. The evasion of this anxiety
in turn leads to boredom with life and being, as Thiele writes. This boredom isolates, and
thus fundamentally, etymologically, homelessness precludes dwelling.
For Orozco and Paz, the roots of this homelessness in Mexico lie in the Conquest.
This homelessness that lies so heavily in the Mexican mind (according to Paz) can be traced
back to the very act of geographical separation of the Spanish from Spain. However, the
assumptions that made such a separation possible and even desirable were already ingrained
in Spanish culture. The Conquest took place in the early years of the Renaissance in Europe,
and its roots lie heavily there. While Renaissance modernity was different from the later
Enlightenment modernity discussed by Giddens, the two are closely related. Giddens’
positing of the modern assumption “of the world as open to transformation by human
intervention” plays strongly here. The Conquest was waged under the assumption of the
possibility (and virtue) of expansion and geographical mobility in the name of expanding
humanist values. And like the theory of correlation discussed in the previous chapter that
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underlies the scientific method, the colonial attitude of the Conquest was also based on the
assumption that words and things have a direct correspondence. This was present in the
mentality of Columbus, for example, and his belief in the unity of the word and the world.
The Conquest represents the violence of that will to unify at the same time that it is the
moment of rupture for both (Paz 96 - 98).
And according to these values, the transition from Spain to Mexico ought not to
have been very significant for a Spaniard. There was no question of the habitability of the
terrain—the fertility of New Spain was unquestionable, and its value saved the Spanish
throne from bankruptcy. However the effects of the trans-Atlantic move of a whole culture
were not as simple as economic gain. The cultural symptoms of the trauma of the loss of
environment, of displacement, of homelessness, surface throughout the history of European
descendents in American lands. Appropriately, the land itself functions as metaphor of this
displacement, as a canvas which could not, as those early moderns might have assumed, be
painted any way the painter chose.
This paper does not wish to focus undue attention on the experience of the
Spaniards at the expense of acknowledgement of the trauma and violence that was visited
upon the indigenous peoples. Certainly, natives whose cultures were changed, suppressed,
and in some cases utterly destroyed would have felt the greatest contextual dissociation in
the Conquest. However, the arguable trauma of the Europeans better proves the point: the
Europeans could (and did) explain the misery of the natives by their (perceived) failure to
effectively integrate into the modern system. However the experience of the Spanish, fully
able and willing to describe themselves as successful within the system they brought, better
makes the point of this essay. In these terms, and certainly not in any way that demands
comparison with the experience of the native peoples, the experience of the Spanish was
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traumatic itself, even if this trauma went unacknowledged. Young explains why:
To be at home in, to belong to a place, as we know, is for it to show
up as a holy, a ‘poetic’ place. In particular, it is for the ‘gods’ of that place,
the ethos of its people, to show up as holy, as, that is, authoritative. To
belong to a place is to be committed to its ethos. Different places, however,
house at least marginally different ‘gods’. Hence the idea of being equally
and fully at home everywhere threatens the unity of a person. This is why,
though not impossible…successful emigration is a slow and difficult process.
What makes it difficult is that, though the change may be no more than a
nuance, it entails and demands a change in personality. Changing places is
changing people (Young 101—102).
For Young, the “unity of a person” is fundamentally related to their environment.
And different environments, if only because of climatic differences, represent unique
challenges and advantages and thus shape cultures, including the experience of the
holy, differently. Leaving a land that participated in the shaping of a culture, as they
inevitably do, threatens that unity, both individual and cultural.
Young’s discussion can be applied to the difficult experience of a Spanish emigrant.
A product of a cultural horizon, to use Heidegger’s terminology, which would have been
intimately connected to Spanish history and geography, the emigrant would eventually either
have to change his horizon, or return to Spain. Emigration is possible, certainly, but if it is
to be achieved in an authentic way, in a way that permits dwelling, it requires a sense of
respect for the new land (not only the land, but the ‘gods’ and ‘ethos’ that are a part of it)
and deep flexibility in the emigrants. However, the emigrating/invading Spanish generally
possessed neither quality. Sports, architecture, courting rituals, laws, religion, gardens,
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animals, flowers, fruits, were all brought into the New World to support a European lifestyle
on Mexican soil. To an equal degree, native culture, even if it provided a more practical,
sustainable living in the American environment, was suppressed.
However, these actions did not keep the Spanish emigrants from undergoing the
inevitable changes Young predicts, even if they fought it. Benedict Anderson discusses the
results of this kind of trauma in the settlement of American lands. Like Paz, he uses the
homeless/orphan metaphor directly as he considers the experience of the Creole
descendents of Europeans. While he frames his discussion in terms of the experience of the
Creole of European descent, the trauma he is discussing could certainly be applied to the
displaced native peoples and mixed-race children that populated the majority of Mexico in
Orozco’s day.
Anderson discusses the unsettling sense of rootlessness for a possible Creole, which
comes about because the individual is torn between his cultural heritage and his geographical
presence. For the second generation emigrant, for the European Creole on American soil,
history still stems from a specific culture—one which evolved in a Spanish climate and
geography, which developed a certain language (including influences from Latin and Arabic)
within a history specific to the Iberian Peninsula. These European influences would shape
him in many ways. However his individual experience would be quite different. Edward
Kamau Brathwaite discusses this sense of dissonance. He talks about the experience of a
young girl, given an English education but born in the Caribbean, writing an essay about
snow falling on the cane fields of Barbados (264). While Brathwaite was largely a proponent
of such creolization as a source of creativity, he also acknowledged that this dissonance
could be a cause of great anxiety and struggle (239 – 240). Anderson discusses a similarly
disconcerting experience for a hypothetical Creole living in Guatemala, but reading a
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newspaper from Madrid. He would be perfectly capable of reading the paper, but it would
have no meaning for him (Anderson 62). It would be a dissociative experience.
Beyond this sense of estrangement from heritage, Anderson describes more practical
and possibly more frustrating effects of the experience of displacement, and the
rebelliousness that might have ensued in the life of the Creole:
Even if he was born within one week of his father’s migration, the
accident of birth in the Americas consigned him to subordination—even
though in terms of language, religion, ancestry, or manners he was largely
indistinguishable from the Spain-born Spaniard. There was nothing to be
done about it: he was irremediably a creole. Yet how irrational his exclusion
must have seemed (59)!
Anderson places this sense of displacement, and the ensuing difficulties both practical and
psychological, at the center of the New World experience.
However these problems, particularly with the Spanish, have gone unacknowledged
for so long partially because the problem of displacement is not one traditional,
Enlightenment-style modernity recognizes (although appropriately the question is a focal
point of post-modern thought). Edward Gibbon, in his treatise “Of Empires and Savages,”
discusses the necessity of emigration for modern, enlightened peoples—in terms reminiscent
of Deely’s discussion of the unexplored field of semiotics—to explore and conquer the
globe in order to spread civilization (Gibbon 649). Anderson discusses the rationalization of
displacement, describing how to the modern mindset rarely even recognizes its psychological
discomfort, except perhaps as a vague sense of unease or an undue amount of racial pride
(58). Significantly perhaps, only those existing outside of the mainstream of modernity have
traditionally been those afflicted with the weakness of homesickness: women, children, and
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slaves. The attachment to place does not fit in with the aspirations of modernity—explorers
and conquerors do not feel homesick.

Hybridity and Fertility
However, as was hinted at in brief reference to Brathwaite, the results of the
displacement and mixture of peoples during the Conquest did not have strictly negative
results. No doubt the very violence of the Conquest, both to native and Spaniard, created a
great incentive to search for a solution to modernity, a deeper awareness that a problem
existed, than in the United States. The revolution in Mexico was therefore, in contrast to the
Creole led, Enlightenment-influenced revolution in the United States, an attempt by a
colonized, hybridized native people to throw off those chains, and to reestablish some of the
shattered traditions of its own past. While perhaps misguided, even the willingness of the
Mexicans of Orozco’s day to buy into the nationalist ideas that inspired Orozco’s Indianists
suggests the desire to return to the semblance of roots, to re-establish a sense of place, to
throw off their homelessness. Rochfort confirms that the Mexican Revolution of 1910 was
in many ways an anti-modernist Revolution:
At a popular level, the nationalists of the Revolution appealed to
‘tradition’ and invoked myths and ideas already formulated during the wars
of Independence. Here was the origin of the prevalent “Indigenismo” and
the exaltation of the insurgent heroes. In this instance the Revolution
represented a revival and a revaluation of fading traditions and repudiation of
the liberal positive epoch (Rochfort 15).
This repudiation he mentions is significant—it was a (more-or-less)
conscious effort to turn away from the system of modernity that had driven the
Conquest and Colonial periods in Mexico. This effort at questioning the “liberal
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positive epoch” would not be matched in Europe, at least not on such a large scale,
until the World Wars, and take even longer in the United States where indeed, it still
struggles.
Of course it would be a mistake to assume that Orozco’s Revolutionary-era Mexico,
because of these factors, suggests a pre-modern perspective. By the time Orozco was
painting, himself of mixed heritage, most serious Mexican artists studied art in Europe and
painted in a Mexico City culturally and architecturally nearer to Paris than Tenochtitlán.
However, no matter how inaccessible the past, because of its history Mexico was a fertile
center of thought on alternatives to modernity. And in these terms, beyond serving as an
apt metaphor for the displacement and homelessness, in other words, the inability to dwell,
of modernity, Mexico also holds a unique place in exploring solutions to these problems—
particularly through the embrace of hybridity.
This cultural hybridity was both symbolic and literal. Unlike in the United States,
Mexico saw relatively little organized attempt to stamp out the indigenous peoples; at least
not on a national scale. Spanish rule was certainly not kind or gentle—quite the opposite.
Throughout the Conquest and Colonial eras, Indians were often enslaved and nearly always
oppressed as a people. Class divisions existed that were almost insurmountable, often
divided along racial lines. However, Paz suggests that while the life of the Indian was
difficult in Mexico, it was easier than in the United States because at least the Mexican Indian
was allowed a place in society, albeit at the bottom of the ladder (101 – 102). Where the
United States enacted programs of segregation and expulsion, and sometimes outright
extermination, Cortez urged his men to take Indian wives and to blend the cultures as
quickly as possible (Spain being dominant of course) (Diaz 85, 125). Again, this is not to be
mistaken for friendliness—this approach by Cortez was meant to function as a sort of
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genetic Conquest which would be more permanent and more difficult to root out than one
built solely on military dominance. Nevertheless, this approach incorporated the natives into
the new society.
Orozco considers the complexities and sensitivities of the issue of racial hybridity in
his “Cortez and Malinche” fresco, further exploring the Mexican perspective on this result of
the Conquest. Rochfort writes:
The “Cortez and Malinche” fresco was the first direct reference by
the Mexican muralists to one of the most significant results of Spanish
colonialism in Mexico, that of the miscegenation or mestizaje of the
indigenous population. The union between the male Spanish European
conquistador and his female Indian mistress was an incontestable historical
fact…In Orozco’s portrayal, the couple are joined hand in hand in an act of
union. This union, however, is seemingly contingent upon Cortez’
subjugation of the Indian, represented in the fresco by a prone and naked
figure under the Spaniard’s right foot. Cortez’s left arm both prevents an act
of supplication for the Indian on Malinche’s part and acts as a final
separation from her former life. The image of Cortez and Malinche
symbolizes synthesis, subjugation and the ambivalence of her position in the
story of the nation’s history of colonial intervention (Rochfort 46).
There is little to add to Rochfort’s analysis, except what may already be clear: in this
image Malinche represents the hybridized Mexican peoples. And while she is
undeniably Indian, because of the Conquest represented by Cortez, she is forever cut
off by Cortez’s unflinching arm from her people and her past. Their union
symbolizes both the violence of the Conquest and the birth of the modern Mexico
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Orozco and his contemporaries wanted to define. Her perceived betrayal of her
people also resulted in the birth of the country as it now stood. This complex
relationship is almost mythological, with whiffs of tragedy and fate, sin and painful
rebirth. At times both Paz and Orozco refer to her as the Mexican Eve (Paz 80, 87).
However, while unquestionably traumatic, the mestizaje or hybridization of Mexico
paved the way to the development of a unique solution to the homelessness of modernity:
hybridity necessarily implies openness to the ‘other,’ or in other terms, a sort of relational
existence. And it was not only the native peoples who underwent mestizaje, both literal and
cultural. The change could never be one-sided if Young’s discussion of place and the
difficulties of emigration are taken seriously, and the Spaniards too were forced to change.
However undesirable it may have seemed to the Spanish emigrants, the cultural and physical
transformation of Mexico into Spain was always a futile attempt. For one thing, there were
already people living there whose very presence refuted the effort. As there were no Indians
in Spain, their very existence in New Spain created the need for change and evolution in the
emigrants—hybridization. One unfortunately common response to this was slaughter. But
this was not, thankfully, a practical arrangement, and the indigenous and mestizo peoples
continued to influence the Spanish, culturally and racially. Even resistance necessitates a
change. Thus, even in the stiffly hierarchical society of Colonial Mexico a kind of
hybridization commenced, not only of people but of ideas, cultures, and landscapes.
The hybridity of the victimized Indians and the orphaned Creoles provides a unique
perspective on modernity, coming not from directly within it but as outsiders brought to it,
late and unwilling. Perhaps again it was this distance that led Mexican thinkers of the early
twentieth century to question its tenets, in art, literature, and philosophy. The Indians’
attempts to survive with whatever pieces of their cultures that could be preserved, combined
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with the Spaniards’ desire to re-create the culture and landscape of their homeland, created
fertile ground for the birth of something altogether new.
Certainly this fertility comprehends philosophical issues. Significantly, in Mexico
these questions were asked not only by its oppressed, colonized class, who could be
expected to subvert the dominant order, but eventually by its educated class as well,
including José Clemente Orozco. Mexico has contributed many artists and thinkers looking
to solve the problems created by modernity arguably because they are born into a world that
is by its history more relational and open to ‘others’ than countries more homogeneously
defined by modernity, such as the United States. Young writes:
What, in pre-modern times, kept ‘the danger’ threatened by all
technology at bay was something lying within the ‘embracing’ structure of
pre-modern culture. The reason, then, for the world-historical takeover by
Gestell and by metaphysics is that we have lost something that pre-modern
culture had, some antidote to the metaphysical misinterpretation of the
technological disclosure of b/Being (Young 55 – 56).
This ‘embracing structure’ of a pre-modern culture could be understood as a
relational ontological structure, one where an individual touches and is touched by
the lives and forces around her. Orozco’s Mexico was actively seeking such a
structure, actively searching for such an ‘embracing’ alternative to the solitary
individualism of Gestell.

Environment
Finally, this paper returns to the art works in question, “Human Sacrifice in Ancient
Times” and “Human Sacrifice in Modern Times.” Having posed and hopefully answered
the question of why the second figure is unable to suffer a ‘good death,’ this paper now asks
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why the first figure is, or at least, is able to approach it more closely. The idea of hybridity
certainly offers a partial solution—as described in the first chapter, associations and relations
are much easier to find in the earlier panel, and the earlier victim himself is a sort of hybrid
between a human and divine figure. Where the figure in the later panel is utterly isolated,
even deprived of eyes and mouth, those organs for interaction with the outside world, the
first figure is under the influence of priests and gods. He is in relation with the world. So
the question remains: where can such a sense of context, manifest in healthy, reciprocal
relationships where value and respect are mutually exchanged, truly be found in the modern
world?
One answer offered by Heidegger and Young has to do with nature. This idea is not
absent from the murals, although understated. The connection between nature and the gods
of Aztec theology was discussed briefly in the first chapter, and here that connection
deserves a bit more thought. The act of sacrifice in the first panel is overseen by the god
Huitzilopochtli, a god of war and death. However he is also known as a hummingbird god
and a sun god. These associations with nature suggest a certain connectivity in Aztec
thought between human lives and the natural world, a symbolic relationship between the two
that functions on many levels. In the later portrait, that sense of connectivity is lost, as the
gods that dominate the second sacrifice are academics and militarists, defined by human
goals and agendas.
While Orozco was painting long before global warming or environmental
devastation had generally become pressing concerns, there is evidence that nature for him
was aligned with a simpler and wiser way of life. Nature appears directly only little in the
mural, but where it does appear is significant. Nature is most visible in the panel of the
“Pre-Columbian Golden Age,” in the form of a field of corn being respectfully grown and
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harvested by the enlightened and civilized Indians. Other references seem to align nature
with the divine, depicting it in the attributes given the panel of gods that presides over the
Golden Age behind Quetzalcoatl (one stands near a volcano, another a lightning flash, one is
composed of snakes, another’s leg curls into a tree root, and another’s limbs seem to
dissolve into flowing water). And nature appears at the beginning and end of the age, in the
waves of the sea that calmly bring the first Aztecs, and again in those which more violently
carry away the departing Quetzalcoatl. The colors of the pre-Columbian section tend to be
more nature-based as well, browns and muted reds, sky blues and sea greens.
However more telling perhaps than where nature does appear in the mural is where
it does not. Its direct references in the first half of the mural are perhaps fleeting, however
there are no references at all to nature after the “Conquest” panel, and even the colors turn
unnatural, either garish or monotone. The backgrounds and division of the panels, rather
than portraying gods or humans, are filled with mechanical imagery, twisting and folding
over itself. It sometimes bears direct reference to technological violence, appearing in the
form of weapons and gas masks. But more often it consists of fields of unidentifiable,
sprawling mechanical wreck. Neither nature, nor the divine that associates with it, can be
found. The only possible reference is in the panel “Gods of the Modern World,” where the
background is consumed by fire. Fire is a natural phenomenon, yes, but one that is purely
destructive. It also serves as an example of a technology that is not evil in itself, but too
often misused by human hands.
This gesture toward nature’s association with divinity and civilization in the first half
of Orozco’s mural underlines the connection between nature and the sense of dwelling
needed to neutralize the horror of suffering and death. And not surprisingly, for Young
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nature and Heidegger’s discussion of dwelling are intimately connected. He discusses
Heidegger as a sort of pre-cursor to the ecological movement, writing:
In my view, in our world, [Heidegger is] an active participant and
partisan in current debates. Partisan for what? For, in a word, ‘ecological’
thinking, though not in the usual sense in which ‘ecology’ means concern for
non-human nature to the exclusion of everything else. ‘Ecology’ derives
from the Greek ‘oikos’ which means ‘house’ and ‘housekeeping’. It is in this
authentic sense of the word that Heidegger is, in my view, an ‘ecological’
thinker. He thinks, that is, towards care-taking the ‘house,’ the house in
which human beings—but human beings in inseparable company with the
creatures of earth, sky, and the holy ‘aether’—dwell. ‘Ethics,’ to repeat,
ponders the dwelling place [the house] of human being (Young 121).
Here Young is careful to point out that a Heidegerrian ecology would be synonymous with a
Heidegerrian ethics. Neither he nor Heidegger is interested in excising the human from the
natural world. Rather it seems that the health of one ought to be regarded as the health of
the other, and vice versa. Further, interaction with nature becomes essential if it can be
accepted that, as Heidegger posits, the very nature of being is relational. Indeed, the more
distant the ‘other’, the more authentic the interaction. And, as will be shortly explored, few
things offer a better instance of an identifiable ‘other’ than silent nature and the
environment.
David Abram takes this discussion of the role of nature in human development and
health further in his work The Spell of the Sensuous. He uses the term “animism” to describe
the expansion of Heidegger’s ontological focus toward the natural world, endowing natural
creatures and objects with significance and meaning beyond their scientific descriptions.
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Appropriately, he includes humanity within that nature—just as objectifying the world has
led humans to objectify themselves, honoring the world necessarily also honors humans.
Here Abram discusses the significance of the earth to human beings, not only in terms of
resource (although certainly that is included), but in terms of relationships and the
importance of context in human dwelling:
From an animistic perspective, the clearest source of all this distress,
both physical and psychological, lies in the aforementioned violence
needlessly perpetrated by our civilization on the ecology of the planet; only
by alleviating the latter will we be able to heal the former. While this may
sound at first like a simple statement of faith, it makes eminent and obvious
sense as soon as we acknowledge our thorough dependence upon the
countless other organisms with whom we have evolved. Caught up in a mass
of abstractions, our attention hypnotized by a host of human-made
technologies that only reflect us back to ourselves, it is all too easy for us to
forget our carnal inherence in a more-than-human matrix of sensations and
sensibilities. Our bodies have formed themselves in delicate reciprocity with
the manifold textures, sounds, and shapes of an animate earth—our eyes
have evolved in subtle interaction with other eyes, as our ears are attuned by
their very structure to the howling of wolves and the honking of geese. To
shut ourselves off from these other voices, to continue by our lifestyles to
condemn these other sensibilities to the oblivion of extinction, is to rob our
own senses of their integrity , and to rob our minds of their coherence. We
are human only in contact, and conviviality, with what is not human (22).
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According to Abram the destruction of nature risks not only the environment and
physical food supply, but the integrity of the senses and the very coherence of the mind. He
echoes Heidegger in the assertion that only through an understanding of others and
acceptance of their ‘ownness,’ and the human relationship with them, can humans
understand themselves. Through this relational understanding humans can overcome the
anxiety of suffering and perhaps obtain a good death. Where anxiety comes about as a result
of fear in the face of suffering and death, peace comes about because of a sense of safety
from it. Young writes that this concept of peace, as opposed to anxiety, is at the center of
dwelling:
[To dwell is] to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in
peace. The word for peace, friede, means the free, das frye (in old German),
and fry means: preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something,
that is, taken-care-of [geschont]. To free really means to care-for (schonen). The
caring-for itself consists not only in the fact that we do no harm to that
which is cared-for. Real caring-for is something positive and happens when
we leave something beforehand in its nature (wesen), [or] when we gather
(bergen) something back into its nature, when we ‘free’ it in the real sense of
the word into a preserve of peace. To dwell, to be set at peace, means to
remain at peace within the free sphere that cares-for each thing in its own
nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this caring-for (Young 63-64).
This is not to say that dwelling provides safety altogether from undergoing death and
suffering. It provides rather a safety from the horror of the solitude and the “infinite
nothing” death can represent. This “infinite nothing” is transcended when an individual
interacts with others. The figure in the first panel is in a state of caring-for and being-cared-
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for. He is interacting with the holy in the world, nature suggested by the intertwining of
ideas about nature and the divine in Aztec cosmology. Nature exists as something
specifically outside of Gestell, outside of Heidegger’s metaphor for modernity as a house of
mirrors wherein man encounters only himself. In nature the fourfold that is considered in
the idea of dwelling can manifest itself outside of the realm of resource.
Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the terms “contextual” and “environmental” are
in a sense interchangeable. Nature alone offers a distant enough “other” which humans can
identify with in order to experience themselves authentically. While it may seem
contradictory to imply that humans must identify themselves with something that is
nevertheless irremediably “other,” in order to overcome the terror of suffering, this is
precisely Heidegger’s point: this identification with difference, and awareness of the self
among a larger context of things (not merely inanimate objects but nature, other humans, as
well as objects and divinities), permits humans to comprehend and find meaning in suffering
and death itself.
However for this to happen requires not only an appreciation of nature. The use of
the term ‘holy’ above, with all its religious nuance, is not accidental. In the quote below
Heidegger’s use of the term Being is interchangeable with an idea of the divine. As a side
note, it is important to distinguish that Heidegger’s conception of Being is complex, and very
different from the Christian God. However it carries nuances of holiness and of sacred
authority, and for the sake of this discussion, understanding Being as a divine authority
should be sufficient:
−since poeisis is the Greek sense of the manifest world as ‘brought
forth’, ‘granted’ to us in Being’s self-disclosing act, the sense of ‘nature’, in
the broadest sense, as the self-disclosure of Being, absolutization renders us
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oblivious to the ‘Es gibt’, to the sense of our world as given to us by the ‘it.’
Oblivion to disclosure is, a fortiori, oblivion to Beings’ self-disclosure (29).
In short, the absolutization of modernity renders humans incapable of understanding
the world as a gift, as something holy in itself that is presented to humans by a grand, holy
other, the ‘it’ as Young says. Michel Serres writes: “Dirty species, monkeys and motorists,
drop their filth fast, because they don’t live in the space they pass through and thus let
themselves foul it” (28). If humans truly lived, or dwelt, in the space they pass through, they
would necessarily care for it. Understanding being as relational, particularly relational with
nature, and the connection between nature and the holy, are steps toward re-endowing the
world with meaning and ‘enchantment.’ In dwelling, nature becomes something with which
humanity must identify itself to escape Gestell. If dwelling can be achieved, then so can,
indeed must, a balanced ecology. However, a closer alignment between the work of Orozco
and Heideggerrian thought can be found in a deeper discussion of the role of the divine in
dwelling, which falls under the next heading.

Religion
There have been many references to religion in this thesis, subtle and not-so-subtle.
Concepts of spirituality certainly play a strong role in Heidegerrian thought. The writings
especially of his later years have been described (sometimes pejoratively) as “mystical.” This
cynicism toward spiritual answers to the practical problems of modernity has a long history.
Quite understandably, religion was and has been one of several targets of modernity from
the beginning, although the movement was complicated and far from united. Alfonso X
served as a good example to many Enlightenment thinkers, who began to ally questioning
the authority of religious institutions with the search for real truth. These writers were
usually not against spirituality in itself—in the eighteenth century Atheism was becoming
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somewhat fashionable for the very bold, but many thinkers still attempted to justify the
Christian god through reinterpretation, or turned to Deism. Nevertheless, even among
thinkers that remained theists, there was an almost uniform turn against organized religion
and its traditions, and particularly the Catholic Church. Many thinkers saw the Church, as
the dominant contributor to the culture of the Middle Ages, as guilty of a sort of sanctified
complacency that had obverted so much potential good and human progress. Condorcet
condemns religion as ‘irrational’ and ‘superstitious,’ as an embodiment of the things which
he perceived his movement as struggling against. He saw religion (as many still do) as
standing opposite modern science and progress (Condorcet 26). In his writings, organized
religion becomes the new demon of the misguided human mind.
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the reduction of experience to
scientific data too often results in a perceived ‘loss of wonder’ in the world. For Heidegger
this loss has religious significance—the loss of wonder is the loss of the holy. Nietzsche
seems to support this idea in his famous passage about the death of God. No Christian
himself and a confirmed cynic about organized religion, this loss of a guiding spirituality is
nevertheless a lamentable passing, the implications of which the world has yet to fully
understand:
‘Where has God gone?’ he cried. ‘I shall tell you. We have killed him you and I. We are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we
able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire
horizon? What did we do when we unchained the earth from its sun?
Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns?
Are we not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, in all
directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an
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infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not
become colder? Is it not more and more night coming on all the time? Must
not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise
of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of
God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains
dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, murderers of all murderers,
console ourselves? That which was the holiest and mightiest of all that the
world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe
this blood off us? With what water could we purify ourselves? What festivals
of atonement, what sacred games shall we need to invent? Is not the
greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods
simply to be worthy of it?’ (The Gay Science 108)
This impassioned line of questioning is one of the most poetic discussions of the
implications for a sense of the sacred in a world dominated by the modern, largely
materialistic perspective. Young further explores this death of God, this loss of wonder, and
extends the discussion into matters of nature:
Gods are, by definition, holy. They appear ‘out of the holy sway’, are
radiantly charismatic. Living gods are figures which inspire us to live
according to the fundamental ethos of our community. This is why they
must be radiant…Christ, for example, must ‘shine’ to inspire one to the
Christian life…but modernity has lost its sense of the holy in general,
Heidegger claims…But loss of radiance, or dis-enchantment…is a necessary
consequence of [modern culture]. If, that is to say, we absolutize our
horizon of disclosure then we become oblivious to the unfathomable depth
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of Being, oblivious to our world as the self-disclosing gift of the infinitely
self-concealing. Instead of the mystery of the ‘globe of Being’, reality is
reduced to (in every sense of the word) a flat, illuminated disk. Instead of
something awesome and astonishing, an object of ‘wonder’, the world
‘obtrudes…in a dry, monotonous and therefore oppressive way’. It loses its
magic, becomes dis-enchanted. That (unlike ancient Greek, Polynesian,
Aboriginal or Mbuti culture) our culture no longer responds to nature as a
sacred place, that it no longer responds to it as, in the words of Being and
Time, that ‘which stirs and strives,’ which ‘assaults us and enthralls us as
landscape’, is another sign of the same phenomenon. Whereas pre-Socratic
Greece was an ecstatic culture, modernity is bored (Young 35—36).
For Heidegger then, the boredom of modernity Thiele so castigated in the
earlier chapter comes from an essentially religious problem. There is no god or sense
of the divine to provide the world with wonder and human life with meaning. This
is not, for Heidegger, entirely a moral failing on the part of modern peoples,
although it is partially. He regarded the Christian god as failed, or at least faded. He
no longer shone because his story was no longer charismatic enough to explain the
world. However, regardless of where blame is assigned, the loss of the gods (and the
subsequent neglect and ‘mundanization’ of nature, to coin a term) is, for Heidegger,
the source of the disenchantment of the world. A new relationship with nature must
be constructed, one that allows for the radiant ‘ownness’ of the non-human to shine
and be cared-for.

Conversion
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The importance of a relationship with living nature to dwelling has been
discussed already. However the solution runs deeper than a mere increase of time
spent in nature—more parks, more camping, etc (although these things may be
beneficial). The role of nature in dwelling is not only aesthetic or recreational, but
ethical and even religious. The question must now be asked: what, then, is the
nature of the change that is required to do away with Gestell? Letting something be
free in its ‘owness’ is, to be sure, crucial for Heidegerrian dwelling. This becomes
quite complicated as it constitutes a simultaneous acknowledgement of and
identification with otherness, however, it can be done. In order to transcend the
terror of death, the human being must identify with something other than itself,
something greater that will either never die, or at least be reborn, as nature renews
itself every year.
It is not difficult to see the religious undertones in such an endeavor, and
Young, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of the displacement of the Spanish,
further explores the religious connection between dwelling and nature, explaining
that nature actually determines, or at least seriously influences, local religions. To be
in a place, to dwell in it, because of the differences in climate and geography, will
necessarily create religious differences:
What needs to be emphasized is that a dwelling space is not just a
region of physical space. It is, rather, an interconnected complex of natural
and cultural features which adds up to the notion of place…In cooler
climates, to take just one example, one grows grain not grapes. But this
entails that festive practices associated with the harvesting and processing of
grapes cannot be part of a culture that belongs to such a climate. Different
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customs, different ‘gods’, in Heidegger’s language, those associated with beer
rather than wine, will belong to Northern places, to Northern ‘earths’ and
‘skies’ (Young 101).
Again, some of the difficulties for the emigrating Spanish can be explained by this quote, as,
due to the physical displacement, even their gods underwent a change. Despite
Catholicism’s ubiquity in South and Central America, there are great differences between, for
example, the Catholicism of the Yucatán Peninsula and the Roman or Spanish variety. More
than this specific example of a changing religion, and keeping in mind Heidegger’s much
looser definition of ‘gods’ as something more akin to a horizonal ‘ethos’ of a people, if
ecology is to be a function of dwelling and not another facet of Gestell, it must be considered
in religious terms.
However again Heidegger’s sense of religion must not be taken as a traditional
Christian theology. Michel Serres writes on the religious deficiencies of modernity, and
provides a clarified notion of the term ‘religion’ which would seem to adhere more closely to
Heidegger’s purposes:
The learned say that the word religion could have two sources or
origins. According to the first, it would come from the Latin verb religare, to
attach. Does religion bind us together, does it assure the bond of this world
to another? According to the second origin, which is more probable, though
not certain, and related to the first one, it would mean to assemble, gather,
lift up, traverse, or reread. But they never say what sublime word our
language opposes to the religious, in order to deny it: negligence. Whoever
has no religion should not be called an atheist or unbeliever, but negligent.
The notion of negligence makes it possible to understand our time and our
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weather…modernity neglects, speaking in absolute terms. It cannot and will
not think or act toward the global, whether temporal or spatial (48).
In this passage Serres purposefully avoids traditional ideas about religion in
order to consider it sociologically: as that which binds—people to one another, to
their gods, to nature. It unifies. However modernity has lost this binding power,
and in its place has grown negligence. Religious negligence, for Serres, is the ultimate
cause of, or even synonymous with, environmental negligence.
Lynn White, in his influential essay “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis”
also suggests the link between ecology, religion, and dwelling. White argues that the
exploitation of nature in modern times is not the result of a technical flaw, but a moral
failing. White argues that the solution to the problem must be something fundamental,
something cultural. Something like a conversion: “Since the roots of our [ecological]
trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we call
it that or not. We must rethink and refeel our nature and destiny” (193).
This divine aspect of reverence and caring-for resurfaces in Orozco’s paintings.
While, once again, Orozco is not condoning human sacrifice, it is significant that the violent
scene in “Human Sacrifice in the Ancient World” is being presided over by a god and
priests. These religious elements add a sense of unity to the image. All are either physically
touching or visually connected, flesh to flesh, with each other, with the victim, and with the
god. One may still take issue with the action depicted (Orozco did), but the truthfulness of
the religion is not the point. The question is whether the presence of the god and the priests
within a unified purpose allows the victim to experience death with ‘equanimity.’ And that
seems to be the case.
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The solution to Gestell and the ability to dwell can, then, be framed in terms of a
conversion. Heidegger calls it a ‘turning,’ a term that in German carries these same religious
nuances. The solution cannot be technological, either positively or negatively (as in
luddism). It will be instead a cultural—indeed a religious—change, a turning away from the
purposes of exploitation and violation to which technology has been put (Young 81). The
turning, because of the reverence and respect for nature that is entailed in dwelling, must be
religious indeed:

“Since the fundamental order of things is divine—the divinity’s—order,

one’s stance to it is one, not of violence, but of, rather, respect and reverence; ‘sparing and
preserving’” (Young 42). The change is that simple.

Conclusion
Yet the change described above is not so simple. Finally, this paper must take a
moment to consider its stance. The majority of this essay has been devoted to explaining the
problems with what Heidegger names Gestell, that is, an attitude toward the world (which
translates into an attitude toward humans) which ‘enframes’ it as resource, or more
accurately, as ‘nothing but’ resource. This Gestell has become dominant because humanity (at
least in the West) has forgotten how to dwell, how to exist relationally between earth, sky,
gods, and mortals. This dwelling is defined by the fundamental characteristic of ‘caring-for,’
which in many ways manifests in a relationship with nature that overlaps with the divine.
However, it may seem as though modernity has been painted here with an overly
broad, bleak brush. However Heidegger’s attitude toward modernity was not an uncommon
one, although his philosophy presented some novel answers. Young writes of the popularity
of this possible pessimism in Heidegger:
Many thinkers, both lay and professional—perhaps even most of us
now that the relative optimism of ‘modernism’ has given way to the end-ofhistory nihilism of so-called ‘postmodernism’—have sensed that there is
something radically amiss with the spiritual condition of the present age.
Heidegger possesses this sense to a preeminent degree. Modernity, he holds,
taking over both the language and sentiment from the early Romantic poet,
Friedrich Hölderlin, is the age of the ‘world’s night’, the age, as we have
already seen, of ‘destitution’ (32).
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Of course the commonality of certain attitudes among thinkers cannot quite
constitute proof of their truthfulness. And indeed, to some, these accusations of isolation
and homelessness in modernity may seem a bit too general. After all, people remain (ideally)
surrounded by families, friends, and co-workers. Many in modern countries have had the
opportunity to travel widely, much more so than past generations. Despite the invasion and
possible isolation of digital culture, people are not forcibly cut off from other people—
indeed digital media often allow increased communication, albeit without physical proximity.
Even animals and variations on the theme of nature are available, in parks and preserves,
zoos and campgrounds. Concepts of religion and the spiritual, while less unified, are still
accessible in numerous churches, as well as New Age stores, books, and meditative getaways.
However, Young suggests that these examples do not discount Heidegger’s theory
but are in fact hopeful signs of the possible ‘turning.’ Heidegger has been accused of
fatalism because of his famous and sometimes shocking phrase “Only a God can save us”
(Der Spiegel Interview 107). Yet Young suggests that the phrase should not be interpreted as
a fatalistic discount of human endeavor. It is rather a counsel toward patience, and humility.
It should not be taken as an excuse to neglect one’s part. In Young’s cautiously optimistic
conclusion, he discusses some of these very phenomena as “cells of resistance” toward
Gestell:
Though we live in the age of ‘the default of God’ this ‘does not deny
that the Christian relationship with God lives on in individuals and in
churches; still less does it assess this relationship negatively.’ Examples of
the former might be tramping clubs, ‘Forest and Bird’ societies, European
ashrams, ‘eco-villages,’ Celtic spiritualists, ‘New Ageists,’ in general (though
there is, of course, a great deal of the sham and sentimental in the new Age
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movement)…
To make the personal turn to dwelling is, in modernity, to become
‘untimely,’ voluntarily marginalized. Hence, though it should by now be clear
that the personal turning is no ‘inner’ emigration, it is an ‘emigration’. To
make the turn is to become, as I should like to put it, a ‘cell of resistance’,
resistance to Gestell (126).
This ‘emigration’ he describes seems to appear in Orozco’s conclusion as well, where the
final panel is titled “The Modern Migration of the Spirit” (see fig. 8). It depicts a Christ
figure, bleeding yet powerful, standing triumphant over his own cross. Significantly, in terms
of Heidegger’s discussion of the importance of the radiance and charisma of the gods, and
the loss of such charisma in modern gods, this figure of Christ shines, painted in some of the
brightest colors in the mural. He draws the eye, dynamic and engaging, suggesting a rebirth
after the monotone of the modern age. He is a reference to Quetzalcoatl’s promise to return
and even the potential for a new golden age.
In his hand is an axe and at his feet lie ruins of statues and architecture, Buddhist,
Greek, and Roman, as well as his own cross. Behind him, as in the other modern panels, are
tools of war, gas masks, tanks, guns, and machinery—but they are now defunct, smashed
and broken. Like Quetzalcoatl, he stands above and beyond the gods that had reigned;
however this Christ is even more violent, perhaps because the offenses of modernity
represent a still lower degradation of humanity than the human sacrifice of the Aztecs before
the arrival of Quetzalcoatl. After all Quetzalcoatl did not actually smash Huitzilopochtli so
much as put him, and the other Aztec gods, in his place. They still exist in the “PreColumbian Golden Age,” intact, but floating behind Quetzalcoatl. Where Quetzalcoatl
brought civilization to an otherwise more-or-less innocent people, this Christ smashes down
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the gods that ruled before him. And he has no more tolerance for traditional Christianity
than Heidegger or Nietzsche, as at his feet lies his own cross, presumably hacked down to
protest all the suffering and pain that has been caused in its (his) name (Rochfort 111). The
figure is surrounded by the remnants of the disasters of the past, but it stands above them,
suggesting hope for a wiser future and a renewed sense of spirituality. He stands in the
position earlier occupied by Quetzalcoatl, poised to commence a new period of civilization.
In this sense, while it may not be possible to fully achieve the sense of
‘dwelling’ Heidegger offers as a solution to the violence and exploitation inherent in
Gestell, Young suggests that resistance is worthwhile, that relations between the
fourfold can be restored. Orozco seems to support this optimism, painting the
potential for a future golden age, a visual equivalent of Heidegger’s ‘turning’
(although one wonders whether Orozco would have trusted a new golden age as any
more permanent than the others he has painted). This ‘turning’ cannot happen
immediately, and does not of course predict the imminent establishment of a ‘true’
religion. But it does suggest the possibility of the end of Gestell.
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Plates and Figures

Figure 1. Diego Rivera: Revolution – Germination. Fresco, 1926. Chapel, west wall,
Autonomous University of Chapingo, Mexico.
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Figure 2. José Clemente Orozco: American Civilization – Human Sacrifice in Ancient
Times. Fresco, 1932. Detail, pre-Cortesian section, Baker Library, Dartmouth
College, New Hampshire.
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Figure 3. José Clemente Orozco: American Civilization – The Arrival of Quetzalcoatl.
Fresco, 1932. Detail, pre-Cortesian section, Baker Library, Dartmouth College, New
Hampshire.

Figure 4. José Clemente Orozco: American Civilization – Pre-Columbian Golden Age.
Fresco, 1932. Detail, pre-Cortesian section, Baker Library, Dartmouth College, New
Hampshire.
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Figure 5. José Clemente Orozco: American Civilization – The Departure of Quetzalcoatl.
Fresco, 1932. Detail, pre-Cortesian section, Baker Library, Dartmouth College, New
Hampshire.
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Figure 6. José Clemente Orozco: American Civilization – Human Sacrifice in Modern
Times (detail). Fresco, 1932. Post-Cortesian section, Baker Library, Dartmouth
College, New Hampshire.
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Figure 7. José Clemente Orozco: American Civilization – Gods of the Modern World.
Fresco, 1932. Detail, post-Cortesian section, Baker Library, Dartmouth College,
New Hampshire.
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Figure 8. José Clemente Orozco: American Civilization – Modern Migration of the Spirit.
Fresco, 1932. Detail, post-Cortesian section, Baker Library, Dartmouth College,
New Hampshire.
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End Notes
i

We refute the artistic calling toward the art of ‘ultraintellectual’ circles, because it is
aristocratic, and we glorify the expression of MONUMENTAL ART, because it is public
property. We proclaim that the present social moment is a transition between a decrepit
order and a new one, and the creators of beauty must use their greatest power to make their
works of ideological value for the people, and that the ideal goal of art, which is now an
expression of individualistic masturbation, should be art for everybody, for education and
for war.
ii

Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust. In this book Bauman describes the
holocaust as not the fluke event it is often considered, but as the logical end of the
mechanization of modernity. Concepts of ‘rule-following’ acting as a moral good, combined
with the efficiencies of specialized labor and bureaucratization of authority led to a new, and
all the more terrifying, method of waging war against the ‘other’.
iii

Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System. Wallerstein refutes the idea of first,
second, and third world countries. He argues that all countries are part of what has become
a globalized economic system, with Eurocentric structures at its core. Often considered
post-colonial, Wallerstein describes what he sees as the inevitable commodification of
people, things, nature, and relationships in a globalized, Capitalistic world.
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